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ABSTRACT

GOOD FOR WHOM? THE FRAMING OF CONFLICT IN POST-9/11 AMERICA, 20012004
by
Joseph Antony Cook
University of New Hampshire, September 2020.

This thesis explores the framing of conflict after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and
more specifically, during President George W. Bush’s first term in office. Notions of
American exceptionalism touched upon every facet of the nation’s response to the attacks,
providing guidance, identity and resolve in the history of the Good War. The immediate
tethering of Pearl Harbor and September 11 in the national discourse exemplified the
foremost role that nostalgia would play in not only making sense of the attacks but devising a
response to them. This thesis recovers what was lost to those destructive comforts in the
collective memory. Indeed, the Bush administration, led by Bush and the unprecedentedly
powerful Dick Cheney, saw opportunity in tragedy, and successfully used the fear and anger
elicited by the attacks to extend the Bush Doctrine to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. For Bush in
particular, however, the war in Iraq was also a divine one — a self-professed mission from
God. The conflict, he pledged, would liberate the Iraqi people from the barbarous Ba’ath
regime and bring democracy to the Middle East. Images of American torture released from
the Abu Ghraib prison, however, fiercely contradicted the president’s narrative. Time and
again, the war on terrorism was framed as a good war. This thesis explains where that term
came from, how it influenced the framing of conflict after the terrorist attacks, and who,
ultimately, the war was good for.

vi

INTRODUCTION
May 7, 2020. “This is the worst attack we’ve ever had,” President Donald Trump
remarked to White House reporters on the COVID-19 pandemic. At the time of speaking,
seventy-five thousand Americans had succumbed to the virus — with experts predicting a
further ninety thousand by August 4, 2020.1 “This is worse than Pearl Harbor,” Trump
continued, “worse than the World Trade Center. There’s never been an attack like this.”2
It is a strange time to be writing about the 9/11 attacks. With New York bearing the
brunt of a new crisis, it is impossible not to draw parallels to the past: for the first time since
9/11, for example, the USNS Comfort has docked in Manhattan to provide emergency
medical assistance. Some have argued, however, that the pandemic signals the dawn of a new
epoch in the nation’s history: “the final nail in the coffin of the ‘post-9/11’ era in which the
United States harnessed all elements of national power to confront the scourge of violent
Islamic extremism,” John Negroponte wrote for USA Today.3 America, currently, faces a
period of transition. “It’s not September 12 anymore,” former deputy national security
adviser Ben Rhodes argued in The Atlantic. To beat the pandemic, he continued, Americans
would have to “move past our post-9/11 mindset” and “change our government’s spending
priorities” — chiefly the inflated Pentagon budget.4 Almost nineteen years removed from the
terrorist attacks, America now faces a new adversary, one entirely different to the defining
issue of the past two decades.

Azad Arman, “US coronavirus death toll passes 90,000 but influential model lowers its prediction.” CNN
Health, May 19, 2020. https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/18/health/us-coronavirus-monday/index.html.
2
Coronavirus: Trump calls outbreak worse ‘attack’ than 9/11 and Pearl Harbor.” Sky News, May 7, 2020.
https://news.sky.com/story/coronavirus-trump-calls-outbreak-worse-attack-than-9-11-or-pearl-harbor11984396.
3
John Negroponte, “Coronavirus signals we must shift from terrorism to new bipartisan intelligence
priorities.” USA Today, March 30, 2020. https://eu.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/03/30/coronavirusnew-intelligence-agenda-needed-column/2935817001/.
4
Ben Rhodes, “The 9/11 Era is Over.” The Atlantic, April 6, 2020.
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/its-not-september-12-anymore/609502/.
1
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Still, in many ways, America remains a nation at war. President Trump has
refashioned himself into a war-time president, describing the pandemic as “our big war”
against “the invisible enemy.”5 His wartime framing extends a uniquely American tradition:
first the U.S. fought against countries, then against concepts starting with the Cold War, and
now, almost seamlessly, pandemics. Beyond generation-defining conflicts in Vietnam,
Afghanistan and Iraq were wars against poverty, cancer, drugs, crime and terrorism. It is a
language all too familiar to the American public: “the magic words,” theologian Stanley
Hauerwas writes, “to reclaim the everyday. War is such a normalizing discourse. Americans
know war… We are frightened, and ironically war makes us feel safe.”6 Despite calls for
America to end its fetishization of war, an argument recently articulated by historian Andrew
Bacevich in The New Republic, Trump’s militarization of the pandemic signals the defining
role that conflict continues to play in American life.7 It is a tradition ingrained in the modern
history of the United States.
A common perception of America’s global standing as exceptional has anchored the
nation’s foreign policy position. American exceptionalism, Donald Pease writes, “includes a
complex assemblage of… assumptions out of which Americans have developed the lasting
belief in America as the fulfilment of the national ideal.”8 It was the Cold War state, Pease

Brian Bennett and Theresa Bresson, “‘Our Big War.’ As Coronavirus Spreads, Trump Refashions Himself
as a Wartime President.” Time, March 19, 2020. https://time.com/5806657/donald-trump-coronaviruswar-china/.
6
Stanley Hauerwas, "September 11, 2001: A pacifist response." The South Atlantic Quarterly 101, no. 2
(2002): 426.
7
Andrew J. Bacevich, “Will 2020 Finally Kill America’s War Fetish?” The New Republic, June 9, 2020.
https://newrepublic.com/article/158092/will-2020-finally-kill-americas-war-fetish. The fetishization of
warfare in our current political-cultural moment, Bacevich writes, extends beyond the coronavirus
pandemic to the Black Lives Matter protests over George Floyd’s death at the hands of the American
police. Senator Tom Cotton’s call for the nation to do “whatever it takes to restore order. No quester for
insurrections, anarchists, rioters and looters,” again exemplifies the centrality of warfare as the governing
metaphor in American civil discourse.
8
Donald E. Pease, The New American exceptionalism. (U of Minnesota Press, 2009): 22. American
exceptionalism, Pease explains, is the lasting understanding of the United States as the model nation—the
national framework to which other nations aspire. The Cold War state warped this ideology into a coherent
foreign policy rationale, justifying America’s intervention in other areas of the world because of the
nation’s exceptionalism.
5
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continues, “that promoted the image of America as the fulfilment of the world’s desire for an
ideal nation into its rationale for imposing and defending the [nation’s] model of nationalism
across the globe.”9 When America resorts to war, so the narrative goes, it does so in the name
of good — in defense of democracy and freedom. When Woodrow Wilson announced
America’s entry into World War I, he asserted, “The world must be made safe for
democracy.”10 When Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill
penned the Atlantic Charter, they extended the assurance that, with the “final destruction of
Nazi tyranny,” all “the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and
want.”11 America’s history is an ode to war and conflict — an episodic narrative of
international duty, benevolence and triumph.12 As that tradition extends into a new era in the
nation’s history, perhaps sounding the death knell for the post-9/11 security state, so it
defined its expansion after the 9/11 attacks.
America’s exceptionalism allayed considerable public fear about the future of the
nation. “Scared and angry,” Rhodes recalls, “I was roused by President Bush’s speech to a
joint session of Congress.”13 Bush reasoned that America was attacked because of its values:
“Why do they hate us?” he explained, “They hate what we see right here in this chamber — a
democratically elected government.”14 To have the event “framed in a way that fit neatly into

9

Pease, The New American Exceptionalism, 22.
Woodrow Wilson, "The World Must be Made Safe for Democracy." Classics of International
Relations (1996): 35.
11
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston S. Churchill, “Atlantic Charter.” The Wiley-Blackwell
Encyclopaedia of Globalization. (2012)
12
Pease, The New American Exceptionalism, 8. As Pease notes, “the conviction concerning America’s
exceptional status nevertheless sustained the sense of continuity in the nation’s geopolitical standing
between 1945-89. Over the period, the interpretive assumptions embedded within this foundational term
have supplied American citizens with the images and beliefs that have regulated the production,
transmission and maintenance of what it means to be an American.” Since World War II, and the
emergence of the Cold War state, the American narrative has been defined by America’s global duty as a
defender of democracy, a position that continues to influence American’s understanding of the nation. For
more examples of this exceptionalism in action, see John F. Kennedy and Ronald Regan’s inaugural
addresses.
13
Rhodes, “The 9/11 Era is Over.”
14
George W. Bush, “Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress,” September 20, 2001 in Selected
Speeches of President George W. Bush, 2001-2008, (The White House, 2008): 162.
10
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the American narrative that I’d grown up with… was reassuring,” Rhodes remembers.
“America had a new national purpose on par with the Cold War — another generational
effort to make the world safe for democracy.”15 As with past conflicts, the war on terrorism
reinvigorated the nation with a sense of global purpose, one lost to the conclusion of the Cold
War. America, once again, assumed the mantle of freedom’s defender.
Most Americans favored a military response to the terrorist attacks. Public opinion
polls conducted immediately after 9/11 suggested broad support for “military engagement in
Afghanistan,” as well as “military action against other countries harboring terrorists.” The socalled “conservative shift” that took place after 9/11 resulted in heightened public support for
a stronger global military presence, which suited the geopolitical aspirations held by many in
the Bush White House.16 The cultural climate during Bush’s first term in office largely
marginalized those who opposed conflict in the Middle East. “I am a pacifist, so the
American ‘we’ cannot be my ‘me,’” Stanley Hauerwas wrote shortly after the attacks:
But what does a pacifist have to say in the face of the terror September 11, 2001
names? I vaguely knew when I first declared I was a pacifist that there might be
some serious consequences. To be nonviolent might even change my life. But I do
not really think I understood what that change might entail until September 11.
For example, after I declared I was a pacifist, I quit singing the ‘Star-Spangled
Banner.’ I will stand when it is sung, particularly at baseball games, but I do not
sing. Not to sing the ‘Star-Spangled Banner’ is a small thing that reminds me that
my first loyalty is not to the United States but to God and God’s church. I confess
it never crossed my mind that such small acts might over the years make my
response to September 11 quite different from that of the good people who sing
‘God Bless America’ — so different that I am left in saddened silence. 17

For those committed to nonviolence, the bonding of patriotism and vengeance after
9/11 defined national belonging in conditional terms: to stand against the war on

Rhodes, “The 9/11 Era is Over.”
Leonie Huddy and Stanley Feldman. "Americans respond politically to 9/11: understanding the impact
of the terrorist attacks and their aftermath." American Psychologist 66, no. 6 (2011): 455-56.
17
Hauerwas, “September 11, 2001: A pacifist response," 428.
15
16

4

terrorism risked alienating oneself from the nation. It was this devotion to America’s
national mission, above all else, that drove the nation to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
To speak out against the use of military force after the terrorist attacks was a
lonely position to occupy — especially on Capitol Hill. On September 18, 2001, a
joint resolution of the United States Congress authorized the president to use all
“necessary and appropriate force” in pursuit of those responsible for the terrorist
attacks.18 The joint resolution passed through the Congress with a single dissenting
vote from Democratic Representative Barbra Lee. “Some of us must urge the use of
restraint… I have agonized over this vote,” Lee reasoned, “As we act, let us not
become the evil that we deplore.” 19 In the Manichean world of George W. Bush,
there was little room for dissension. “Either you are with us or you are with the
terrorists,” said Bush on September 20, 2001 — a warning to his fellow countrymen
as much as other nations.20 The illusion of consensus in Bush’s America relied upon
an imposition of the majority opinion as the American one. Lee’s single vote paled in
comparison to the five-hundred and eighteen permitting Bush the power to wage war.
Still, as the war in Iraq edged closer, record numbers took to the streets in
protest. On February 15, 2003, approximately one million people gathered in London
to protest the potential war.21 That same day, millions combined in protest across
Europe, including major demonstrations in Madrid, Vienna, Brussels, Paris, Berlin,
Athens and Rome. In New York, five hundred thousand demonstrators flooded the

18

107th Congress Public Law 40. U.S. Government Printing Office. Congressional Record, Vol. 147
(2001): 115.
19
Barbra Lee. "Why I opposed the resolution to authorize force." Meridians: feminism, race,
transnationalism 2, no. 2 (2002): 278-280.
20
“President Bush Addresses the Nation.” Washington Post, September 20, 2001.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html
21
“Anti-war rally makes its mark.” BBC News, February 19, 2003.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/2767761.stm
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city. Outside the United Nation’s headquarters, Martin Luther King III bemoaned:
“Just because you have the biggest gun does not mean you must use it.”22
Commenting on the anti-war demonstrations, Patrick Tyler of the New York Times
observed, “there may still be two superpowers on the planet: the United States and
world opinion.”23 Again, the majority position masqueraded as the national
consensus: the protests held in one-hundred and fifty American cities revealed a
fractured nation torn between war and diplomacy.
The international protests failed to temper the Bush administration’s zeal for
military intervention in Iraq. National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice argued that,
from a human rights perspective, the protests would “not affect [the administration’s]
determination to confront Saddam Hussein and help the Iraq people.” Rice’s was a
familiar argument: the national leadership, she appeared to suggest, knew best. 24
Republican Senator John McCain, too, condemned the protests as “foolish”: “[the
Iraqis] will be far, far better off when they are liberated” from Hussein’s “brutal,
incredibly oppressive rule,” he explained.25 Even as Americans flooded the streets in
protest, their leaders remained reticent to listen, steadfast in their understanding of the
conflict as a just war.26

Martin Luther King III quoted in Sue Chan, “Massive Anti-War Outpouring.” CBS News, February 16,
2003. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/massive-anti-war-outpouring/
23
Tyler, “Threats and Responses”, New York Times.
24
Condoleezza Rice quoted in Karin Simonson, “The Anti-War Movement: Waging Peace on the
Brink of War.” Programme on NGOs and Civil Society, Centre for Applied Studies in
International Negotiation, Geneva, (2003): 17.
22

John McCain quoted in Patrick E. Tyler, “Threats and Responses: News Analysis; A New Power in the
Streets.” New York Times, February 17, 2003. https://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/17/world/threats-andresponses-news-analysis-a-new-power-in-the-streets.html
26
Christian Enemark and Christopher Michaelsen. "Just war doctrine and the invasion of Iraq." Australian
Journal of Politics & History 51, no. 4 (2005): 545-563.Just War doctrine sets forth a series of criteria
necessary for a war to be considered justified ethically. In the context of Iraq, Enemark and Michaelsen
write, those reasons included Just Cause of self-defence and humanitarian intervention and proportionate
cause. In all three cases, Enemark and Michaelson conclude, the Just War doctrine “shows the Coalition’s
military campaign was unjust.” The argument that the war in Iraq was just was often used to pacify dissent
and garner support for the Iraq War by the Bush administration.
25
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The title of this thesis owes much to Studs Terkel’s “The Good War”: An Oral
History of World War II. He places the term “good war” in quotations to hint at the
oxymoronic nature of the marriage, as if war could ever truly be good. As Terkel found, such
notions are entirely subjective — contingent upon who is asked. Still, romanticized
conceptions of the national past guided the war on terrorism and healed the damaged national
psyche after 9/11. “The flag that flew in mourning was soon transformed into a pride-filled
thing,” writes Stanley Hauerwas. “The bloodstained flag of victims transformed into the flag
of the American indomitable spirit. We will prevail no matter how many people we must kill
to rid ourselves of the knowledge that Americans died as victims. Americans do not die as
victims… No one who died on September 11, 2001 gets to die a meaningless death. That is
why their deaths must be revenged.”27 Perhaps more accurately, when Americans do die as
victims, they do not die in vain. The national foreign policy pursued after the attacks
privileged a desire for vengeance and justified aggressive military intervention through the
prism of national exceptionalism. Doing so assured many that, as in the past, the war on
terrorism would be waged in the name of good.
It should come as no surprise that, facing a nadir in public approval, Trump has
returned to the familiar wartime trope. War rallies support for presidents, who often “wag the
dog” — that is, use war to distract from other issues — to save an election campaign.28
Following the extrajudicial killing of George Floyd, however, Trump’s America has become
a nation divided in war — not united by it. Responding to the national outrage precipitated by
Floyd’s murder, Trump announced “Operation Legend” — which would send a “surge” of

Hauerwas, “September 11, 2001: A pacifist response," 426-27. This is not, of course, representative of
Hauerwas’s own perspective, as a pacifist, but his observation of the broader culture of patriotism and
vengeance that swept the nation after the terrorist attacks.
28
Thomas Friedman, “Trump’s Wag-the-Dog War.” New York Times, July 21, 2020.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/21/opinion/trump-portland-syria.html.
27
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federal security forces to Chicago.29 A desperate attempt to “salvage his campaign,” Thomas
Friedman observed for the New York Times, “Trump turned to the Middle East Dictator’s
Handbook and found just what he was looking for… Turn [the citizenry] against each other
and then present yourself as the only source of law and order.”30 Barbra Lee’s prescient
caution as she voted against the war authorization in 2001 feels as relevant now as then: “As
we act, let us not become the evil we deplore.” The national leadership plays a defining role
in upholding, or corroding, those values that separate the United States from its adversaries.
While history never repeats itself, the great Mark Twain is frequently quoted, it does rhyme.

“Trump to send ‘surge’ of hundreds of federal agents to cities.” BBC News, July 23, 2020.
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-53507660
30
Friedman, “Trump’s Wag-the-Dog War.”
29
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CHAPTER I
ANOTHER DAY OF INFAMY: PEARL HARBOR, 9/11 AND DESTRUCTIVE
COMFORTS IN THE COLLECTIVE MEMORY

The Destructive Comforts of the Good War
In times of unprecedented crisis, comfort can be found in collective memories. People
in the present, David Lowenthal argues, “seek reaffirmation. The past endorses present views
and acts, showing their descent from or likeness to former ones. Precedent legitimates current
practice.”31 At the time of the September 11, 2001 attacks, momentous events in the national
collective memory centred around collective grief, with instances of death holding a
particular staying power in the realms of collective remembrance: John F. Kennedy’s
assassination; Princess Diana’s death; the Oklahoma City bombing; the attack on Pearl
Harbor.32 Grief, writes Ernest Renan, carries more value than triumph in the collective
memory because it imposes a “sense of duty and requires common effort.”33 Episodes of
death and destruction, as well as the shock that follows, find meaning in the collective
memory as symbols of cohesion and national purpose. It was this common past that
Americans looked to post-September 11 for comfort, reassurance and guidance.
References to Pearl Harbor dominated immediate reflections on the terrorist attacks.
“Attack on America: Another Day of Infamy,” proclaimed Howie Carr of the Boston Herald
on September 12, 2001.34 “This is War,” added Stuart Bykofsky of the Philadelphia Daily.
“9-11 has joined 12-7 as a day of infamy that will live forever.” 35 “Americans are not a
vengeful people,” the Green Bay Gazette asserted, “but when our very freedoms are under
attack — as they were when we joined World War II after the bombing of Pearl Harbor —

31

David Lowenthal, The past is a foreign country revisited. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 92
“America’s Collective Memory.” Pew Research Centre US Politics & Policy. July 3, 1999.
https://www.people-press.org/1999/07/03/americas-collective-memory/
33
Ernest Renan, Qu'est-ce qu'une nation? 1882. 50
34
Howie Carr, “Attack on America; Another Day of Infamy.” The Boston Herald. September 12, 2001.
35
Stuart Bykofsky, “THIS IS WAR.” Philadelphia Daily News, Philadelphia PA. September 13, 2001.
32
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we demand justice.”36 Across the nation, abstractions of Pearl Harbor in the collective
memory offered refuge in a timeless narrative of “tragedy, resolve and eventual triumph.”37
World War II, many Americans agreed, was a good war — a necessary battle to combat
fascism, “an evil and expansionist system.”38 While many historians recognize that this rosetinted view minimizes the uglier aspects of the conflict, such as the internment of Japanese
Americans, the notion of the good war has endured. There was little question that the
impending war on terrorism, like World War II, would be a good one.
Tasked with explaining the inexplicable, journalists immediately relied on the Pearl
Harbor analogy: September 11 became “the Pearl Harbor of a new millennium”; a “terrorist
Pearl Harbor”; a national awakening; a second day of infamy.39 Facing the completely
unexpected, writes Emily Rosenberg, it is often “reassuring to discern some familiar pattern,
to domesticate the strangeness of the present by invoking the familiarity” of a shared past.40
Post-9/11 references to Pearl Harbor — for better or worse — channelled the nation’s grief
into a reassuring sense of mission. “In times such as these we all must look for the deeper
meaning. We have to turn back to our roots,” wrote Patrick Bourn in a letter to The
Tennessean on September 16, 2001. “Not since Pearl Harbor has America had to deal with a
direct attack against the U.S. […] Veterans and civilians of the past paid what they had to so

“In Our View.” Green Bay Press Gazette, Green Bay Wis. September 16, 2001.
Brian T. Connor, "9/11–A new Pearl Harbor? analogies, narratives, and meanings of 9/11 in civil
society." Cultural Sociology 6, no. 1 (2012): 4
38
Richard Polenberg, “The Good War? A Reappraisal of How World War II Affected American Society.”
The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 100, No. 3, The Home Front and Beyond:
Virginians in the World War 2 Era (1992): 297. This understanding, Richard Polenberg notes, rests on a
number of underlying assumptions about the Second World War: that it was a just war “fought only for the
right of people everywhere to live in freedom and security,” and that the U.S. was not “motivated by a
desire for conquest.” There is also an understanding of the war as being fought, Polenberg continues, “by a
largely united people, who shared purpose not only led them to make sacrifices for the common good but
also enabled them to transcend ethnic divisions and religious differences.”
39
“Daily Digest.” Rochester Democrat and Chronicle. September 16, 2001; “Pearl Harbor’s Infamy Is
Echoed by 9-11.” The Los Angeles Times, December 7, 2001.
40
Emily S. Rosenberg, A date which will live: Pearl Harbor in American memory. (Duke University Press,
2003):175
36
37
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that the U.S. could become what it is today. Now it is our turn.”41 A nostalgia for the good
war seemed to encourage outright warfare as a prelude to national redemption. Emboldened
by Pearl Harbor and its aftermath in the collective memory, the nation was nearly united in a
demand for military justice.42
Americans embraced a sense of timelessness between the two events.43 September 11,
David Halberstam argued in the Boston Globe, “had a December 7 quality about it” because
of “the break that day has with events, as if things have changed so profoundly from that day
on. It’s like a new calendar has been given to us.”44 The overt similarities between the two
seemingly collapsed the decades of history that separated them. “I feel like going to war
again,” declared one World War II veteran attending a reunion of the USS Intrepid in
Nashville. “No mercy.”45 “We have to come together like ’41 and go after them” added one
New Yorker. “That’s the only way we can stop this thing.”46 The circulation of Pearl Harbor,
and by extension the good war, as a unifying emblem of national defeat and eventual triumph
offered a reassuring schema for the post-9/11 nation.47 Few paused to consider whether
outright warfare best suited the decentralized nature of modern terrorism.48

“Letters to the Editor.” The Tennessean, Nashville Tenn. September 16, 2001.
Leonie Huddy and Stanley Feldman. "Americans respond politically to 9/11: understanding the impact
of the terrorist attacks and their aftermath." American Psychologist 66, no. 6 (2011): 455. See also: Leonie
Huddy, Stanley Feldman, Theresa Capelos, and Colin Provost. "The consequences of terrorism:
Disentangling the effects of personal and national threat." Political Psychology 23, no. 3 (2002): 485.
43
William H. Sewell Jr, Logics of history: Social theory and social transformation. (University of Chicago
Press, 2005): 8-9. Sewell Jr. defines an event as a “turning point” or “watershed” in history, which divides
“the flow of history into distinct eras.” Historians, Sewell posits, “see the flow of social life as being
punctuated by significant happenings, by complexes of social action that somehow change the course of
history.”
44
David Halberstam quoted in Donald Aucoin, “Remembering the Date.” Boston Globe, Boston Mass.
October 2, 2001.
45
Tom Infield, “Attack reverberates around the nation: Many Americans expressed fear as buildings
closed.” Philadelphia Inquirer. September 12, 2001.
46
Infield, Attack reverberates around the nation, Philadelphia Inquirer.
47
Sewell, Logics of History, 131. Sewell defines schema as “general procedures applied in the enactment
or reproduction of social life” such as “rules of etiquette” or “sets of equivalences.” Sewell’s term aids in
describing how Pearl Harbor provided a set of general historical procedures through which the post-9/11
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The common thread connecting the two events, many argued, was their shared status
as “direct attacks” upon the nation.49 “We are used to seeing these tragedies in countries
across the globe, but never in our backyard, killing our American people,” the Los Angeles
Times reported on September 13, 2001. “In sixty years, students will learn about Tuesday the
same way students learn about Pearl Harbor.”50 As direct attacks, the two shared an elevated
sense of importance because they occurred within the nation’s borders — they were attacks
on America proper. Few cared to mention the more recent al-Qaeda attacks on America in
Kenya, Tanzania and Yemen.51 While Halberstam suggested that 9/11 represented a break
from previous events, the method of the Nairobi bombing suggested a continuity between the
two.52 While the scale of the Nairobi attack certainly differed from that of September 11—
leaving eleven American citizens dead — it offered the most logical frame for comparison in
understanding a new era in transnational terror. 53 However, in Pearl Harbor and the good war
that followed, the post-9/11 nation recognized a comforting symbol of American identity — a
triumphant past worthy of structuring the present. From the general public to policy makers,
Americans embraced a distant past steeped in nostalgia.54
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Traditionally, scholars have separated memory from history. Memories are often
denigrated as “recollections, imperfect and incomplete, colored by personal experiences and
biases.”55 This distinction, writes Jacob Dickerson, “overlooks the necessarily rhetorical
nature of history, and its practice as the selection of important or relevant information
arranged into a story told for a particular purpose.” 56 In the tradition of Pierre Nora, this
chapter advocates for a “history that is interested in memory not as remembrance but as the
overall structure of the past within the present — a history of the second degree.” 57 It is a
history “less interested in events themselves than the construction of events over time; less
interested in ‘what actually happened’ than in its perpetual reuse and misuse, its influence on
successive presents.”58 In the immediate post-9/11 period, memories of Pearl Harbor
emboldened calls for aggressive military intervention in the Middle East, and overruled the
need for a nuanced consideration of al-Qaeda’s peculiarities. Nationwide, contemporary
references to a day of infamy invoked Pearl Harbor’s memory with an idealized fixity — as a
universal symbol of national victimhood and the beginning of a righteous conflict. However,
even the indelible good war had its complications.
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Framing of Pearl Harbor
December 8, 1941. “The facts of yesterday and today speak for themselves,”
President Roosevelt declared before Congress following Japan’s bombing of American naval
and military bases across Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam and Wake Island. Despite Japan’s
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ago.” Per the Global Newsstream database, between the time of the attacks and December 7, 2001, no
fewer than 1,160 newspaper stories published across the nation referenced Pearl Harbor and September 11
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campaign in the Philippines representing a much larger defeat “in terms of casualties and
scope of combat,” Clayton Chun notes, the attack at Pearl Harbor “frequently overshadows
the Philippines” as a more devastating military defeat. 59 Roosevelt’s “fear that the damage [in
the Philippines] might not be perceived as hitting close enough to home” guided his
prioritization of Hawaii, given that few in the continental United States supported a military
defence of remote territories.60 “Yesterday,” Roosevelt famously opened to Congress,
“December 7, 1941 — a date which will live in infamy — the United States of America was
suddenly and deliberately attacked.”61 Few presidential addresses have endured in the
collective memory like Roosevelt’s declaration of war. Yet the president’s iconic speech
almost read entirely differently. Take, for example, the alterations made to his first draft:
“Yesterday, December 7, 1941, a date which will live in world history infamy, the United
States of America was simultaneously suddenly and deliberately attacked.”62 With his
alterations, Roosevelt ensured that December 7 would endure in the national collective
memory as a symbol of injustice and deceit. Few knew better than the president himself that
the facts rarely, if ever, spoke for themselves.
Suddenly
Roosevelt appreciated the power language wielded in shaping history. “No one knew
better than he,” remembered Robert Sherwood, “that once he had the microphone before him,
he was speaking for the eternal record.”63 Roosevelt’s emphasis on the sudden nature of the
offensive, writes Rosenberg, ensured that the historical record started “with the surprise

59

Clayton KS. Chun, The Fall of the Philippines 1941–42. (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2012): 5.
Rosenberg, A day which will live, 14-5; Remote territories borrowed from Daniel Immerwahr, How to
hide an empire: A short history of the greater United States. (Random House, 2019): 6.
61
Roosevelt, Address to Congress.
62
“Address to Congress – Declaring War on Japan.” In “Franklin D. Roosevelt, Mater Speech File, 18981945. File no. 1400–A, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum. Accessed Feb. 3, 2020.
[emphasis my own]
63
Robert Emmet Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An intimate history. (Pickle Partners Publishing,
2017): 219.
60

14

attack on Pearl Harbor, establishing American military action as reactive and defensive.” 64 In
actuality, America was already entangled in a warfare-of-kinds. By January 1941, writes
Edward Miller, America was engaged in “full-blooded financial warfare against Japan.”65
The 1917 Trading with the Enemy Act “evolved into the ultimate U.S. weapon of financial
power,” shrinking Japan’s commercial sphere to “the yen bloc of its colonies and conquered
regions.”66 The financial freeze, Miller concludes, presented Japan with a Hobson’s choice:
“suffer economic impoverishment, accede to American demands to yield territorial conquests
or go to war against the United States and its allies.”67 Japan chose the latter. To the Japanese,
the decision to attack was a response to economic sanctions imposed by Roosevelt and his
administration. To many Americans, however, Pearl Harbor was a sudden and deceitful
attack which demanded an unforgiving military response.
Infamy
Undeniably, the most famous aspect of Roosevelt’s speech came with his declaration
of a “date which will live in infamy.” The “infamy framing,” writes Rosenberg, allowed
Roosevelt to summon “the nation to fight not just an enemy, but a treacherous people who
would deceitfully negotiate peace while preparing for a surprise war.”68 The framing of the
Japanese people as personally deceitful only bolstered American’s understanding of their
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cause as morally justified. “Avenge December 7” became a popular refrain on wartime
propaganda posters.69 If “suddenly” made the narrative simple, then “infamy” made it
personal. The masterful framing of the conflict through Pearl Harbor injected the war with a
sense of moral purpose, and assured Americans that when attacked, war was not only
necessary, but justified. The notion of the good war, in this sense, began with the bombing of
Pearl Harbor.
The endurance of the infamy frame demonstrates the power of language in defining
historical moments. The framing of the bombing as a direct and unprovoked attack on
American soil suited both past and present needs. For Roosevelt, a focus on the more
conspicuous details of the event itself distracted from increasing hostilities precipitated by his
administration’s financial freeze of Japan. For the post-9/11 nation, the Pearl Harbor frame
functioned as a reaffirming call to arms grounded in a common national identity. The infamy
framing, in this sense, lent meaning to present circumstances, providing a common lexicon to
tether past and present trials in the nation’s history. As such, an idea of Pearl Harbor in the
collective memory has long triumphed over its reality. It is an inherently human tendency,
writes David Thelan, to “search for common memories to meet present needs and through a
process absorb a negotiated meaning into ongoing concerns.”70 Romantic notions of a second
good war guided American’s understanding of a potential conflict in the Middle East: Pearl
Harbor, Rosenberg adds, “provided the relatively uncomplicated call for national unity and
personal commitment to war to the end against evil.”71 This was the ultimate lesson from
Pearl Harbor and Roosevelt’s speech that Americans carried with them — that the United
States would fight to the end, not negotiate peace.
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Pearl Harbor in the Twenty-First Century
The dawn of the twenty-first century witnessed a renewal of interest in the past
prompted by the discontinuity of a new millennium.72 Change, writes Michael Kammen,
“propels nostalgia, a quest for timelessness, which then offers opportunities to sell
repackaged, imagined versions of the past.”73 With the release of Walt Disney Company’s
Pearl Harbor on May 25, 2001, the Pearl Harbor mythology returned to the fore of the
national consciousness. 74 The film proved a commercial hit, opening to a domestic weekend
gross of $75 million.75 In a review for the New York Times, John Dower observed, Pearl
Harbor “lingers in the mind as a paean to patriotic ardour and an imagined American
innocence — beautifully choreographed, sweetened with romance, sanitized to an attractive
level.”76 The film triggered a summer of nationwide nostalgia, a self-contained “memory
boom” — prompting the release of a wide array of Pearl Harbor-related products, including
books, websites and nostalgia products.77 Pearl Harbor’s memory “became so ubiquitous in
American culture by the summer of 2001,” Rosenberg remarks, “that a stranger to the planet
might have assumed the bombs had just been dropped.”78 Meanwhile, as the nation looked
back to old threats, the intelligence community scampered to prevent a new one.
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The national mood sharply contrasted with what those in the intelligence community
were calling the “summer of threat.”79 “The whole system was blinking red,” recalled Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director George Tenet on the threat that al-Qaeda posed
throughout the summer of 2001.80 Indeed, as intelligence officials increasingly braced for the
inevitability of an attack on American soil, the public harkened back to the triumphs of the
nation’s “Greatest Generation” in Pearl Harbor.81 As Daniel Martinez notes, the film
“created an audience anxious to learn,” which surely primed the pump of Pearl Harbor related
content released in anticipation of the event’s sixtieth anniversary, which included more than
twenty documentaries and nine major books.82 The summer of 2001 also witnessed increased
foot traffic to World War II memorial sites, a testament to the swelling nostalgia sweeping
the nation prior to the attacks.83 These seemingly disparate worlds — of nostalgia and threat
— merged when al-Qaeda attacked the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September
11.
Journalists played a key role in connecting the two.84 Following the attacks, the
nation’s leading national newspapers, the New York Times and Washington Post, relied on the
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Pearl Harbor analogy to explain the terrorist attacks. 85 Time magazine, too, published an
article calling for revenge through the memory of Pearl Harbor. “A day cannot live in infamy
without the nourishment of rage,” Lance Morrow argued in Time on September 12, 2001:
“Let’s have rage. What’s needed is a unified, unifying, Pearl Harbor sort of purple American
fury, a ruthless indignation…. This is the moment of clarity. Let the civilized toughen up and
let the uncivilized take their chances in the game they started.86 Morrow’s rage reflected the
national mood. His argument, that America would once again wage war in the name of
civilization, framed the conflict in terms of a “clash of civilizations” — an attitude of national
exceptionalism, Slavoj Žižek argues, entrenched in the minds of many Americans. “Let us
recall the letter from the seven-year-old American girl whose father was a pilot fighting in
Afghanistan,” writes Žižek:
she wrote that — although she loved her father very much, she was ready to let
him die, to sacrifice him for the country. When President Bush quoted these lines,
they were perceived as a ‘normal outburst’ of American patriotism; let us conduct
a simple mental experiment and imagine an Arab Muslim girl pathetically reciting
into the camera the same words about her father fighting for the Taliban — we do
not have to think for long about what our reaction would have been: morbid
Muslim fundamentalism which does not even stop at the cruel manipulation and
exploitation of children... Every feature attributed to the Other is already present
at the heart of the USA. Murderous fanaticism? There are in the USA today more
than two million Rightist populist ‘fundamentalists’ who also practice a terror of
their own, legitimized by (their understanding of) Christianity… In the traumatic
aftermath of September 11, when the old security seemed to be momentarily
shattered, what could be more ‘natural’ than taking refuge in the innocence of a
firm ideological identification?87
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Žižek rightly notes that, for many Americans, misguided notions of the nation’s
exceptionalism guided a “clash of civilizations” framing of the necessary response to the
terrorist attacks.88 “When I saw the first building collapse, I felt like a true American for the
first time,” said Matt Sadewitz, a senior at Randolph High School on September 12, 2001.
“Now I know how the men who enlisted because of Pearl Harbor felt.”89 In the construction
of national identity, Duncan Bell writes, a sense of belonging derives from nationalist
discourse — the ability to “understand oneself as located in a temporally extended narrative”
that represents “the unfolding of time in such a way that the nation assumes a privileged and
valorized role.”90 Pearl Harbor’s enduring mythology provided young Americans with the
language necessary to make sense of the terrorist attacks. In the Dayton Daily News,
fourteen-year-old Leah Gaffney composed a poem comparing the two events:
Freedom itself was attacked this morning
By a faceless coward
Bush proclaimed to the nation
About the attacks
Hoping to catch
Whoever it was that paid us a visit
And killed many of us.
Many think of this day
As a Pearl Harbor of this generation.
September Eleventh Two Thousand One
Will be remembered forever
As a day of infamy
And many can only wonder
Is it over?
Or has this war
Just begun?
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She added: “I put my heart and soul into this poem”. 91 Students who had hitherto experienced
Pearl Harbor from the comfort of desks grappled with the notion that they were now
experiencing one of their own. Its memory figured as an ideological waypoint, emblematic of
an American exceptionalism which Žižek argues was comforting, intoxicating and,
ultimately, fictitious.92
Given the complications of waging war in the Middle East, perhaps Vietnam would
have served as a more appropriate cautionary tale. Had Lyndon Johnson fully considered the
manifold issues resulting from military intervention in the region, Richard Neustadt argues,
he might have erred on the side of caution.93 Post-Vietnam movies like Francis Ford
Coppola’s Apocalypse Now articulated the fallacy of America’s military strength in light of
its disregard for the nuances of warfare in Vietnam, and the challenges posed by a
meandering and directionless war. If World War II was America’s good war, then Vietnam
was it’s bad one: “How do you ask a man to be the last man to die for a mistake?” John Kerry
famously posed to the U.S. Foreign Relations Committee on Vietnam on April 22, 1971.94
The nation’s failure in Vietnam stressed caution when waging war, no matter how righteous
the cause. As the overwhelming early support for the war on terrorism indicated, however,
peace was not what many in the public desired.95 Indeed, the framing of the U.S. response to
9/11 as a war on terrorism was itself historically constructed. In November 2001, eightyseven percent of the public understood that the “unconventionally defined war” might “drag
on.” 96 Perhaps this marks the greatest difference between Vietnam and the war on terrorism:
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Americans largely agreed that the war on terror would be a long one and supported it
nonetheless. 97
New Frontiers: The Bush Administration and Pearl Harbor
In times of war, presidents benefit from a spike in public approval, and George W.
Bush proved no exception.98 The terrorist attacks crafted what Calvin Mackenzie terms a
“government moment, a time for citizens to recognize and appreciate the services that
government provides.” Most importantly, Americans were listening to and trusting
communications from their government officials.99 Like Roosevelt, the administration framed
the impending conflict through the memory of Pearl Harbor. “December 7 was a turning
point for the world and September 11 should be no less so,” Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz observed in a November 14, 2001 speech. “On 9/11, our generation received one
of history’s greatest wake-up calls. Like the ‘Greatest Generation,’ we must answer that call.”
100

Exactly where that call would take the nation, or who it would be fighting against,

remained vague. What was made abundantly clear, however, was that from the crucible of
warfare, America would emerge as the protector of democracy and liberty on the world stage
— as it did after World War II.
December 7, 2001. “What happened at Pearl Harbor was the start of a long and
terrible war. Yet out of that surprise grew a steadfast resolve that made America freedom’s
defender,” President Bush declared to an audience of crew members of the USS Enterprise
on the sixtieth anniversary of Pearl Harbor’s bombing. “And that mission, our great calling,
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continues to this hour, as the brave men and women of our military fight the forces of terror
in Afghanistan and around the world.”101 Nowhere in his speech did Bush elaborate on the
intricacies of the modern terrorist threat, nor did he discuss at any great length the battle with
al-Qaeda in Nairobi, Tanzania or Yemen. Instead, he looked to Pearl Harbor on its
anniversary to articulate the nation’s global mission.102 Doing so fashioned a common unity
from national grief, signalling America’s long-held duty as “freedom’s defender” — a
mission which started, but did not end, with the defeat of the axis powers.
The framing of the conflict as a continuation of the good war offered an inviolable
moral defense for a swift and unrelenting military response, one that extended well beyond
Afghanistan. America’s new enemy, Bush argued one month later, was an “axis of evil” —
Iran, Iraq and North Korea. The term, presidential speechwriter David Frum explains, was
inspired by Roosevelt. “For FDR,” Frum observed:
Pearl Harbor was not only an attack — it was a warning of future and worse
attacks from another, more dangerous enemy… no country on earth more closely
resembled one of the old axis powers like present-day Iraq. And just as FDR saw
in Pearl Harbor a premonition of even more terrible attacks from Nazi Germany,
so September 11 had delivered an urgent warning of what Saddam Hussein could,
and almost certainly would do with biological weapons. The more I thought about
it, the more the relationship between terror organizations and the terror states
resembled the Tokyo-Rome-Berlin Axis. 103

The axis framing dangerously implied a sense of cooperation between al-Qaeda and the
“axis” threat, as Graham Allison argues, “conceptually, the ‘axis’ suggested a relationship
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among entities that doesn’t exist.”104 Indeed, in Frum’s own words, his task was to find the
language necessary to “go after Iraq.”105 As intended, the term seamlessly shifted the focus of
the war on terrorism to new frontiers, while remaining firmly within the bounds of national
exceptionalism.106 The history of the good war not only helped Americans to understand the
attacks themselves, but the national mission beyond them.
Had Americans fully understood the history behind the terrorist attacks, it would have
been impossible to attribute them to anyone other than al-Qaeda’s leader, Osama bin Laden.
However, months into war with Iraq, the majority of the American public believed that
Saddam Hussein was personally involved in the terrorist attacks.107 The reduction of
September 11, like Pearl Harbor, to the event itself erased its broader context — a history that
not only clarified who attacked America, but how it should respond. While the public
demanded justice for those lost to the attacks, and rightly so, the pre-9/11 era in
counterterrorism cautioned that conventional methods of war potentially emboldened bin
Laden’s cause, and contributed to support for his terrorist organization.
The Longue Durée of the War on Terrorism
In February 1998, Ali Soufan started his first rotation as a rookie agent at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) field office in New York. An Arab-American born in
Lebanon, Soufan originally applied to the bureau as a bet with his fraternity brothers: “they’ll
probably think it’s a joke application” one taunted.108 More importantly, however, the job
afforded Soufan the opportunity to further his interest in the effects of nonstate actors on
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global stability.109 As a graduate student at Villanova University, he became fascinated with
Osama bin Laden, a Saudi billionaire who sacrificed a life of luxury to fight alongside the
mujahedeen in the Soviet-Afghan War.110 Soufan noticed that bin Laden was growing
increasingly hostile towards the United States, a hostility that culminated in his proclamation
of jihad in 1996. “Terrorizing you, while you are carrying arms on our land, is a legitimate,
reasonable and morally demanded duty,” bin Laden warned the United States. “The youth
know that the disgrace and shame that afflicted the Muslims, by occupying their sacred
places, would not be removed except by jihad and explosives.” 111 As early as 1996, bin
Laden was launching sinister threats towards the United States. Soufan took notice.
Unable to find any literature on bin Laden when he started at the bureau, Soufan
drafted a memorandum on the subject to his superiors, urging that they read bin Laden’s
recent fatwa calling upon Muslims to kill Americans irrespective of gender, age or civilian
status. The memorandum caught the attention of Kevin Cruise, a member of the bureau’s I-49
counterterrorism squad.112 Published by an Arabic newspaper in London, the fatwa called for
the murder of any American, anywhere on earth, “as the individual duty for every Muslim
who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.”113 The direction highlighted the
diffuse and highly ideological nature of al-Qaeda’s mission. After introducing Soufan to the
rest of the 1-49 squad, Cruise and his team agreed that an intensified focus on bin Laden was
a necessity.114 The fatwa, the group concluded, “was a serious warning.”115
Three months later, bin Laden called a press conference from al-Qaeda’s Jihadwol
training camp in Khost, Afghanistan. In attendance was John Miller, an American journalist
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who arranged to interview the al-Qaeda leader for ABC News. Before the interview, Miller
was told that bin Laden’s answers would not be translated back to him. “If the answers are
not translated now, how can I ask follow-up questions?” Miller asked.
“Oh, that will not be a problem,” an aide responded, “there will be no follow-up questions.”
True to his fatwa, bin Laden explained to Miller in Arabic, “We do not differentiate between
those dressed in military uniforms and civilians… they are all targets… It is our duty to lead
people to the light.”116
Once the interview concluded, Miller — unable to understand bin Laden’s answers — sought
out his translator Ali, and asked: “So, do we have a story? Please tell me it wasn’t just an
hour of ‘Praise Allah’ bullshit.”
“We have a very good story,” Ali replied. “He was looking right into your face and saying
that you — the Americans — would be going home from the Middle East in coffins and
boxes.”
Miller paused. “So, you’re telling me he’s promising genocide and I’m nodding like an
asshole?”
“Yes,” Ali replied, smiling.117 Miller’s sense of humour betrayed the solemnity of the
situation — bin Laden had once again reiterated his desire to attack America. This time, he
addressed the American public directly.
Back at the field office in New York, Soufan was raising the alarm. “That’s it, that’s
the third warning. First there was the declaration of jihad, then the fatwa, and now he’s going
straight to the American people. I think it’s a warning that al-Qaeda is about to attack. We
need to be prepared,” he cautioned Cruise.118 Only in retrospect would agents learn that
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embedded in Miller’s interview were subtle hints at al-Qaeda’s impending terror operation in
East Africa. Over his shoulder, bin Laden inconspicuously pinned a world map with Africa in
clear view.119 This tactic would become a hallmark of al-Qaeda’s future media
communications: bin Laden had a penchant for theatricality and showmanship.120 Yet at the
time of the interview, he remained largely anonymous to the American public. As Miller later
recalled of the encounter: “nobody wanted [the interview]… they couldn’t understand that it
was a big deal… because nobody really knew who bin Laden was in the general public.”121
Instead, the domestic media were engrossed in the emerging Clinton-Lewinsky scandal,
which dominated the national conversation throughout 1998. To an uninterested American
public, Miller concluded, bin Laden remained “just another Arab terrorist.”122
In the early hours of August 7, 1998, President Clinton awoke to the news that the
American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania had been attacked in near-simultaneous
bombings. The attacks marked a significant shift in al-Qaeda’s activity. As Salim Hamdan,
bin Laden’s personal driver, later recalled, “[it] was the first time that bin Laden was
essentially going face-to-face with the Americans.”123 The East Africa operation showcased
the sophisticated and transnational capabilities of the al-Qaeda network. Two Nissan Atlas
trucks, packed with two thousand pounds of TNT, ammonium nitrate, and aluminium powder
were detonated just a few minutes apart at embassies over five hundred miles apart in Nairobi
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and Dar es Salaam.124 “Multiple, simultaneous suicide bombings” were “a new and risky
strategy,” Richard Wright notes, but they were also effective — “a showy act of mass murder
with no conceivable effect on American policy except to provoke a massive response.”125 Bin
Laden was hoping, Wright adds, to provoke an aggressive military response in Afghanistan,
which was “already being called the graveyard of empires.”126 Upon hearing of the attacks,
Assistant United States Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald remarked, “now it begins.”127
On August 20, 1998, bin Laden got his wish when the United States launched
Operation Infinite Reach, which accentuated the pitfalls of conventional warfare as a
response to al-Qaeda’s attacks. On August 20, 1998 — just weeks after the bombings in
Kenya and Tanzania — a series of cruise missile attacks were launched towards various alQaeda training camps in Afghanistan and a pharmaceutical factory in Sudan, suspected of
producing XV nerve gas for bin Laden.128 Of particular interest was the Farouk training camp
near Khost where, through intercepts of bin Laden’s satellite telephone, the CIA determined
bin Laden was headed. However, at the last minute, he pivoted for Kabul. Ultimately, the
three quarters of a billion-dollar military campaign failed to kill a single high-ranking alQaeda official.129
Worse still, the failed military operation exacerbated anti-American sentiment
throughout the region. According to Wright, Operation Infinite Reach established bin Laden
as a “symbolic figure of resistance, not just in the Muslim world but wherever America… had
made itself unwelcome.”130 Most experts agree that the attempt to develop “a credible
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deterrence against al-Qaeda” with targeted cruise missiles failed.131 Indeed, perhaps the
greatest takeaway from the operation was that a war of attrition would only promote bin
Laden’s cult-like anti-Western appeal, while the United States footed the bill. The
organization relied upon a religious fanaticism that transcended the parameters of person or
place.
The response did little to temper al-Qaeda’s determination to wreak terror. On
October 12, 2000, two al-Qaeda operatives, Ibrahim al-Thawr and Abdullah al-Misawa,
prepared to strike America for a second time. Wielding a small fibreglass fishing boat packed
with explosives, the operatives’ target was the USS Cole, a guided-missile destroyer
refuelling at the Tawahi harbour in Aden, Yemen. Running ahead of schedule, the Cole crew
reconvened for an early lunch while security topside awaited the arrival of a third and final
trash boat — the last of its chores.132 This came as welcome news to Commanding Officer
Kirk Lippold, who was anxious to return to sea where he knew the destroyer was safest. 133
And so, when Thawr and Misawa approached their gargantuan target, they exchanged
friendly waves and smiles with those topside anticipating the final trash boat.134 Minutes
later, Lippold, who had retired to his office to tackle a stack of arduous paperwork, was lifted
by the impact of a violent explosion. In total, the attack killed seventeen sailors and injured a
further thirty-seven.135
In disbelief, officers on-board the Cole speculated over the possibility of an oil
explosion. The sheer force of impact, however, indicated to Lippold that the Cole had been
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attacked. He immediately called Fifth Fleet Tactical Flag Command Center in Bahrain and
reported “an OPREP-3, Pinnacle, Front Burner Report”: OPREP-3 meant his report would
reach the highest levels of command; Pinnacle signalled a matter of national-level media
attention; Front Burner indicated an attack on American Forces. In no uncertain terms,
Lippold believed the attack was an act of war on the United States.136 The bombing marked a
significant victory in al-Qaeda’s war on American modernity. For bin Laden, the symbolic
significance of his carefully orchestrated David-versus-Goliath attack was cause for
celebration. Emboldened by the Cole’s decimation, he organized a spontaneous wedding for
his son, Mohammad. There, his men sang:
Our men are in revolt, Our men are in revolt. We will not regain our
homeland. Nor will our shame be erased except through blood and fire. On
and on it goes. On and on it goes.137
The conflict with al-Qaeda in East Africa and Asia captured the global scope of the
terrorist organization. After the attacks in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam, American intelligence
officials learned of an al-Qaeda switchboard operated by a jihadi named Ahmed al-Hada in
Yemen. The telephone connected a global network of operatives located in Afghanistan,
Yemen, Malaysia, Kenya and Europe.138 The World Trade Center facet of the operation was
led by the “Hamburg cell” based in Germany, which included Mohammad Atta, Ramzi
Binalshibh, Marwan al Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah.139 Soufan’s first investigation into al-Qaeda
included a figure named Khalid al-Fawwaz, who first established the Nairobi cell before
being sent to London by bin Laden to run an operation in the United Kingdom.140 While the
Japanese bombers at Pearl Harbor carried the recognizable symbol of the rising sun on their
planes, al-Qaeda donned no such insignia, and operated in covert cells around the globe. The
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“identification problem” proved to be an enduring thorn in the nation’s side, given that the
enemy was impossible to differentiate from innocent civilians.141 While the majority of
Americans supported a strong military response to the attacks, ideological warfare demanded
a different approach.142
The notion after 9/11 that America should, as one construction worker from
Bradenton, Florida put it, “Find out whoever did it and wipe ‘em off the map,” was
complicated by the fact that al-Qaeda’s influence spanned the entire globe.143 To defeat the
terrorist organization, Soufan concluded in his memoir, the nation would have to operate on
knowledge, not fear:
People ask what is the most important weapon we have against al-Qaeda, and I
reply, “Knowledge.” This is true in anything from deciding how to interrogate a
suspect—whether to torture him or to outwit him to get information—to dealing
with rogue states: do we simply resort to force, or do we first try to understand
their thought processes and internal divisions and try to manipulate them? It’s the
difference between acting out of fear and acting out of knowledge. Our greatest
successes against al-Qaeda have come when we understood how they recruited,
brainwashed, and operated, and used our knowledge to outwit and defeat them.
Our failures have come when we instead let ourselves be guided by ignorance,
fear, and brutality.144

While a certain comfort derived from comparisons to Pearl Harbor and the idea of an
unrelenting military victory in the Middle East, it contradicted the opinions of experts like
Soufan. The disconcerting reality of the situation was that an ideology could not be defeated
through bombs alone. Unfortunately, however, fear proved a more valuable currency to the
Bush administration.
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Conclusion
The memory of Pearl Harbor provided Americans with a modicum of comfort after
the 9/11 attacks. Journalists, politicians and everyday Americans drew upon a collective
mythology to essentialize foreign policy debates through a victorious and triumphant national
past. Romanticized notions of the good war reminded Americans of their exceptionalism, and
emboldened calls for a second good war to defeat terrorism. This negated the importance of a
far more proximate and educational history — that of the longue durée of the war on
terrorism in East Africa and Asia. The costly failure of deterrence efforts in Afghanistan
signalled the inefficacy of conventional methods of warfare against al-Qaeda. Indeed, past
military failures warned that an aggressive military response in the Middle East could further
destabilize the region and increase support for Osama bin Laden. The comforts provided by
the national collective memory, in this sense, erased important lessons for the nation moving
forward.
Many came to view 9/11 as a fundamental break from previous events. It was not. It
did, however, mark a significant escalation in al-Qaeda’s ongoing war of terror. Separating
9/11 from a history of fundamentalist hostility in the Middle East, dating back to bin Laden’s
fatwa in 1996, generated considerable public confusion over who orchestrated the attacks.145
This allowed for an expansion of the unilateralist Bush Doctrine beyond the narrow
constraints of al-Qaeda and Afghanistan.146 The Bush Doctrine, set forth in the 2002 National
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Security Strategy, stipulated that, “To forestall or prevent… hostile acts by our adversaries,
the U.S. will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.”147 A belief that the United States should play
the preeminent role in securing democracy on the world stage guided the nation to a preemptive war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, despite Hussein playing no role in the terrorist
attacks. The alarm generated by 9/11 opened new opportunities to reconfigure America’s
global standing: for Bush and his advisers, the war on terrorism was a good one indeed.
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CHAPTER II

NEXT STOP SADDAM: THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, 9/11 AND THE IRAQ WAR

Smoking Guns and Mushroom Clouds
The terror attacks transformed the complexion of Bush’s presidency. Despite Tenet’s
warning of the increased threat bin Laden posed to the United States throughout the summer
of 2001, the president’s attention remained fixed on delivering a primary campaign promise,
a substantial tax cut. For Bush, terrorism was something of a non-issue.1 “I didn’t feel that
sense of urgency,” he later explained to Bob Woodward, “my blood was not nearly as
boiling.”2 The attacks thrust Bush into an unanticipated wartime presidency defined by his
administration’s global response to the terror attacks. The shocking footage of planes
colliding with the World Trade Center — the quintessential symbol of global economic
power — shattered illusions of American invulnerability to threats waged in distant lands. 3
The sobering reality of the attacks, that even American cities could fall prey to a barbarism
hitherto unimagined, propelled international terrorism to the fore of the national
consciousness.
Throughout his presidential campaign, Bush set forth a modest foreign policy agenda.
“I’m not so sure the role of the United States is to go around the world and say this is the way
it’s got to be,” Bush claimed at the second presidential debate at Wake Forest University on
October 11, 2000. “I think [we] must be humble and must be proud and confident of our
values, but humble in how we treat nations that are figuring out how to chart their own
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course.”4 Future national security adviser Condoleezza Rice stressed a similarly laissez-faire
policy in an issue of Foreign Affairs months prior: “The first line of defence should be a clear
and classic statement of deterrence — if they [Iraq] do acquire WMD, their weapons will be
unusable because any attempt will bring national obliteration.”5 Any reassurance provided by
the ‘mutually assured destruction’ policy eroded after the terrorist attacks, which loomed as a
reminder of the threat hostile regimes posed to the nation. The attacks drastically altered
Bush’s position on foreign affairs — particularly in relation to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.
“September the 11th changed the strategic thinking,” Bush remarked at a press conference on
Iraq shortly before his declaration of war. “It used to be that we could think that you could
contain a person like Hussein, that oceans would protect us from his type of terror.” The
statement appealed to fear more than anything else. “September 11,” Bush concluded,
“should say to the American people that we’re now a battlefield.”6
There was little doubt that, when capable, Hussein was willing to exact untold cruelty
upon his own people. In the Iraqi city of Halabja in 1988, Hussein killed an estimated fivethousand citizens in a poison gas attack — seventy-five percent of whom were women and
children.7 While UN sanctions imposed after the Persian Gulf War appeared to demilitarize
the regime, apprehension persisted over Hussein’s aspiration to develop nuclear and chemical
armaments. In a speech to the UN General Assembly in 2002, Bush charged that Hussein
broke his pledge to halt Iraq’s weapons program by producing “tens of thousands of litres of
anthrax and other deadly biological agents.”8 Fears of a second, more lethal attack on the
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nation, this time orchestrated by Hussein, generated a renewed sense of urgency over the Iraq
question. In a televised address on October 8, 2002, Bush reasoned:
While there are many dangers in the world, the threat from Iraq stands alone
because it gathers the most serious dangers of our age in one place… Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction are controlled by a murderous tyrant, who has
already used chemical weapons to kill thousands of people… Facing clear
evidence of peril we cannot wait for the final proof, the smoking gun that could
come in the form of a mushroom cloud.”9

The fear generated by the terrorist attacks allowed Bush and his advisers to reconfigure
relations with Iraq: a policy of deterrence quickly shifted to pre-emptive warfare. Prior to the
attacks, administration officials believed that a war with Iraq would serve the national
interest, as Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued to Condoleezza Rice on July 27,
2001, “ousting Hussein” would “much-improve” the United States’ stature in the Middle
East.10 The war on terrorism opened new avenues to legitimately strike at Saddam and extend
American hegemony under the guise of humanitarian interventionism — from its very
inception, Saddam was a primary target. What was good for America, the Bush Doctrine
purported, was good for the world.
The War on What, by Whom?
“A little inaccuracy sometimes saves tons of explanation.”
Saki, The Square Egg, 1924
On the evening of the attacks, Bush convened his “war cabinet” to discuss his
administration’s response to the day’s events. The nation was at war “with a new and
different kind of enemy,” Bush determined, and the solution was the total elimination of
“terrorism as a threat to our way of life.”11 This started with al-Qaeda’s safe haven,
Afghanistan, but, as Bush stressed in his speech to the nation that evening, did not end
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there.12 Bush wondered whether Hussein might have played a role in the attacks, citing Iraq’s
support for Palestinian suicide terrorists.13 Key members of Bush’s counsel favoured preemptive war to oust Hussein, irrespective of the dictator’s role in the terrorist attacks. Chief
among them was Dick Cheney, Bush’s vice president.
For Cheney, it was imperative that the administration’s response to the attacks reflect
the novel and growing threat of international terrorism.14 Cheney was unlike any vice
president before him. He enjoyed unprecedented authority as Bush’s enforcer, presiding over
important decisions within the administration, while acting as a “self-appointed examiner of
worst-case scenarios.”15 In areas where Bush struggled, particularly foreign policy, he often
deferred to Cheney, who served as secretary of defence under his father, George H. W.
Bush.16 Prior to assuming the presidency, Bush confided in Condoleezza Rice — with whom
he struck a close relationship during his election campaign — “I don’t have any idea about
foreign affairs. This isn’t what I do.”17 To proactively combat the terrorist threat, Cheney
believed that America should not be required to wait for a “smoking gun,” advocating instead
for a pre-emptive military strategy requiring a lower standard of proof.18 He had long
expressed interest in targeting Iraq, harbouring “a deep sense of unfinished business” from
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the first Gulf War.19 The vice president, observed Woodward, “was beyond hell-bent for
action against Saddam. It was as if nothing else existed.”20
Equally eager to target Hussein was Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Cheney’s longtime friend and former colleague during the Ford presidency. 21 Together, Cheney and
Rumsfeld forged a formidable coalition. “There was a line from the vice president directly to
the secretary of defense, and it’s as though there was a private line between those two,”
recalled Richard Clarke, a member of the National Security Council.22 This posed a
significant challenge to the less experienced Condoleezza Rice, who served as national
security adviser during Bush’s first term. “She knew that if she took on Rumsfeld or Cheney,
or, more often than not, both of them… she would be distancing herself from the president,”
recalled Lawrence Wilkerson, former chief of staff to Colin Powell.23 Above all else, Rice
desired a close relationship with Bush, as a friend of hers observed: “I think she just really
likes Bush as a person… she’s still sort of starstruck… policy wasn’t as important as that
friendship.”24 This, Thomas Preston argues, “meant that the national security council
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wouldn’t play the… devil’s advocacy role it performed in other administrations. It meant that
important decisions on Iraq… were quite narrowly focused and driven by the dominant views
of Bush’s inner circle.”25 Benefiting from a highly amenable national security adviser,
Cheney and Rumsfeld commanded the lion’s share of the president’s time and attention on
Iraq.26 As Deputy National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley concluded, “The real work was
being done upstairs with the president, Cheney and Rumsfeld.”27
As early as May 31, 2001, Rumsfeld and his neoconservative deputy, Paul Wolfowitz,
were pushing for an invasion of Iraq. Wolfowitz, writes Woodward, “believed it was possible
to send in the military to overrun and seize Iraq’s southern oil fields, which had about twothirds of Iraq’s oil production, and establish a foothold… [From there] support would be
given to the anti-Saddam opposition, which would rally the rest of the country and overthrow
the dictator.” Wolfowitz, Woodward observed, “was like a drum that would not stop.”28
Within the White House, Wolfowitz became the “neoconservatives’ leading voice,”
advocating for the use of military force to “extend democracy” and achieve national goals:
“the best democracy program ever invented,” one neoconservative boasted, “is the United
States Army.”29 The neoconservative vision took particular interest in Iraq, where, Walter
LaFeber writes, neoconservatives believed “democracy could take over not only to topple
Saddam but also protect the more democratic Israel.”30 Wolfowitz viewed Iraq as the ultimate
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source of the “terrorist problem,” and, according to Colin Powell, saw Bush’s war on
terrorism “as one way of using the event [9/11] as a way to deal with the Iraq problem.”31 In
this, Wolfowitz was not alone.
Rumsfeld, too, recognized opportunity in tragedy. Soon after American Airlines
Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon, Rumsfeld contemplated the possibility of invading Iraq,
jotting in his personal notes: “Hit S.H. [Hussein] @ same time – not only UBL [bin
Laden].”32 When Bush reconvened his war council at Camp David on September 15, 2001,
both Wolfowitz and Rumsfeld suggested Iraq be the target in the first wave of the war on
terrorism. “Even if there was a ten percent chance that Hussein was behind the 9/11 attack,”
Wolfowitz wrote to Rumsfeld, “maximum priority should be place on eliminating that
threat.”33 Despite “no compelling case” existing that “Iraq had either planned or perpetrated
the attacks,” recounted Richard Clarke, “I think we knew pretty much [the week of the
attacks] that the probability of finding a justification for going to war with Iraq was high on
the agenda.”34 “I realized with almost a sharp physical pain,” Clarke recounted in his memoir
Against All Enemies, “that Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz were going to try and take advantage of
this national tragedy to promote their agenda about Iraq. Since the beginning of the
administration, indeed well before, they had been pressing for war.”35 For Cheney, Rumsfeld
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and Wolfowitz, whom Wilkerson described as an “unholy conglomeration of decision
making that haunts us still,” Iraq had long been atop the foreign policy agenda.36
Unlike his colleagues in the War Cabinet, Secretary of State Colin Powell opposed
military intervention in the Middle East.37 Powell, however, shared a volatile relationship
with Bush. “A sense of competition hovered in the background of their relationship,”
Woodward observed, “a low-voltage pulse nearly always present.”38 “There was some fear of
[Powell], politically… his polls were in the stratosphere, like Mother Teresa’s,” remembered
Wilkerson. “They [Bush and Cheney] were jealous of that.”39 Despite calls for Powell to run
for president in 2000, his endorsement of Bush legitimized the Texan as a “competent leader
in foreign policy and military affairs,” an area of scrutiny throughout Bush’s election
campaign.40 Unsurprisingly, writes LaFeber, Bush was unenthusiastic “about giving much
credit for the victory to Powell.”41 The president’s ego, which fuelled an “uncomfortable
relationship” between the two, distanced the distinguished Powell from his inner ranks.42
Unlike his colleagues, Powell later disclosed to Wilkerson, he was far less willing to “rub the
president’s cowboy attitude.”43 His exclusion owed much to Bush’s desire to project
confidence as a wartime leader, despite his superficial grasp of foreign policy issues.
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By his own admission, Bush lacked foreign policy knowledge, a shortcoming many
within the administration were privy to. “It is true that [Bush] was a novice in foreign
policy,” Assistant Secretary of State Kim Holmes recalled, “and had figures around him like
Powell, Rumsfeld, Cheney… who knew a lot more about the issues than he did.”44 To
compensate, Bush projected himself as an instinctive leader, skilled in the art of delegation.
“If I have any genius or smarts,” Bush assessed of his leadership style, “it’s the ability to
recognize talent [and] ask them to serve and work as a team… I trust their judgement.”45
Unlike Powell, Cheney was all too willing to pander to Bush’s self-anointed role as “the
Decider.”46 “This guy was just totally different,” he said of Bush. “He just decided here’s
what I want to do, and I’m going to do it. He’s very directed… very focused.”47 Sorely
lacking experience, however, Bush often “deferred to Cheney” during foreign policy
meetings, and heavily relied on “the wrong advice” from “a severely limited circle of likeminded advisers on Iraq,” according to former National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft. 48
A man of great self-confidence, Bush offset his glaring inexperience with a self-assured
bravado, while trusting (and relying on) the guidance of administration hardliners,
predominantly Cheney.49 It was a trade-off that suited both parties.
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Powell was acutely aware of Bush’s tendency to be swayed by his closest advisers.
On the subject of invading Iraq, Powell cautioned Bush, “This is not as easy as it is being
presented… You don’t have to be bullied into this.”50 A moderate who stressed deliberation,
Powell represented the antithesis of the Bush White House culture: he “would not, quote, go
locker-room, unquote. He wouldn’t slap anybody on the ass with a towel… with Powell in
the room, it’s kind of like, ‘you don’t swear in front of your father,’” remembered Richard
Armitage, Powell’s deputy.51 This, Powell often joked with Armitage, led to his being
“frozen out by the White House – in the ‘icebox’ or the ‘refrigerator.’”52 In everything he did,
David Satterfield observed, “Bush constantly reminded those around him that he was in
charge.”53 When it came to his own decision making, Bush held zero patience for deliberation
or second-guessing, as Wilkerson observed: “Not only was he a president who believed in
being aloof from the details, being the ‘great decision maker’ as he himself had said… the
guy who makes the big ones… he was also lazy in my view… And he’d say, ‘My decision is
made! Its sacrosanct!’54 Powell challenged Bush’s wholesale belief in his gut-instincts,
forcing him to confront the minutiae he so adamantly avoided.55 “You are going to be the
proud owner of twenty-five million people,” he cautioned Bush in a rare private meeting on

50

Woodward, Plan of Attack, 22.
Author interview with Richard Armitage, December 15, 2008 in Preston, Pandora’s Trap, 80.
52
Woodward, Plan of Attack, 79.
53
Interview with David Satterfield, in Woodward, The War Within, 407.
54
Author interview with Lawrence Wilkerson, June 28, 2008 in Preston, Pandora’s Trap, 43. Wilkerson
offers an intimate portrait of the relationship between Bush and Powell that is highly unlikely to be
expressed by Powell himself. Powell’s loyalty to Bush, despite his disagreement over policy decisions, is
well documented. As Tim Bakken writes, “Powell’s reflexive obedience to Bush was forged in a military
culture that elevates loyalty over truth.” See Tim Bakken, The Cost of Loyalty: Dishonesty, Hubris, and
Failure in the US Military. (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2020): 13.
55
Woodward, The War Within, 433. “For years, time and again,” Woodward observed, “President Bush
has displayed impatience, bravado, and unsettling personal certainty with his decisions…” It is difficult not
to see this as part of the President’s own lack of foreign policy knowledge, and total disregard for context
or details. As Richard Clarke recounted, “The problem was that many of the important issues, like
terrorism, like Iraq, were laced with important subtlety and nuance. These issues needed analysis and Bush
and his inner circle had no real interest in complicated analyses; on the issues that they cared about, they
already knew the answers, it was received wisdom.” Bush, in this sense, had no desire to look beyond what
he believed he already knew, a policy position which his advisers often indulged. See Clarke, Against All
Enemies, 243.
51

43

Iraq. “You need to understand this is not going to be a walk in the woods.”56 Despite his best
efforts, Powell failed as a lone dissenter within Bush’s ranks. Powell “really underestimated,
badly, the vice president, the secretary of defense, and their ability to… get the right things
out of him. I think he overestimated his own ability to prevent that,” Wilkerson observed.57
Ultimately, Bush wanted confidence, not questioning, from his closest advisers, which he
received, in abundance, from Cheney and Rumsfeld.58 Above all else, Bush valued consensus
and loyalty. Unfortunately for Powell, to Bush — an obstinate leader with a disdain for
questioning — dissent equalled disloyalty.59
In recent years, Dick Cheney has been the subject of increased public scorn as the
puppet-master behind the Iraq War. Likened to Satan by actor Christian Bale, who played
Cheney in Adam McKay’s Vice, Cheney has received all-too much credit as the “stringpulling power behind the throne,” to quote Todd McCarthy of The Hollywood Reporter.60
Such accounts fundamentally misunderstand the dynamics of the Bush administration, and
the principle role Bush’s own arrogance played in the making of foreign policy during his
first term.61 Bush’s tendency to rely on his gut-instincts fuelled a “shoot-from-the-hip”
policy-making culture, a product of his own inexperience, or, as John Kerry determined,
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ineptitude.62 Figures like Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz dominated Bush’s attention
because they played the game according to his rules, as Scott McClellan observed: 63
Overall, Bush’s foreign policy advisers played right into his thinking, doing little
to question it or to cause him to pause long enough to fully consider the
consequences before moving forward. And once Bush set a course of action, it
was rarely questioned. That is what Bush expected and made known to his top
advisers… there would be no handwringing, no second-guessing of the policy
once it was decided and set in motion.64

And while the President did rely on the advice of his inner circle, he made the penultimate
decisions. 65 “They would not push Bush in different policy directions than he was already
predisposed to agree with,” writes Preston, “since they shared his deeply conservative
perspectives.”66 More accurately, while Bush believed himself to be the play calling
“decider,” the ideologues he so often relied on — Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz —
heavily conditioned his understanding of foreign policy and conflict after 9/11.67 By design,
the war in Iraq was a team effort.
Let’s Roll: Selling the Good War, the Bush Way
“A belief is not true because it is useful.”
Henri-Frédéric Amiel, Amiel’s Journal, 1883.
Few could argue that Bush lacked charisma. He “had a reputation as a wise guy with a
good sense of humour,” remembered photojournalist David Hume Kennerly, who captured
Bush’s first election campaign. “If he hadn’t quit drinking, he’s the kind of guy you’d like to
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have a beer with.”68 As president, Bush remarked to Senator John McCain, he aspired “to be
like Ronald Reagan,” which influenced his framing of the post-9/11 world. Like Reagan’s
damnation of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire,” Bush condemned Iraq as part of an “axis
of evil.”69 This discourse reflected Bush’s idiosyncratic worldview, as one scholar
commented on a White House meeting he attended on the Middle East, “much of the
discussion focused on the nature of good and evil, a perennial theme for Bush, who casts the
struggle against Islamic extremists in black-and-white terms.”70 President Bush conveyed
information in the manner he preferred to receive: simplistic, value-laden, decisive and with
conviction.71 This communication style proved wildly popular among the general public after
the terrorist attacks.72
For many Americans, the 9/11 attacks took a personal toll. Seventy-one percent of the
American public reported immediate feelings of depression, while one in three reported
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issues sleeping at night.73 Acutely aware of the nation’s vulnerability to international
terrorism, the public looked to the president for guidance through a low moment in the
nation’s history. “The zeroes world of George Bush,” Johnathan Franzen wrote for the New
Yorker, would be defined by a longing to “return to the ordinary, the trivial, and even the
ridiculous in the face of instability and dread.”74 The unique cultural moment suited Bush’s
interpersonal style: as McClellan observed, “much of what the general public knows about
Bush is true. He is a man of personal charm, wit, and enormous political skill.”75 As a
wartime leader, Bush relied on a strength that helped him succeed as a business student at
Harvard University, as the Governor of Texas, and as a candidate for the United States
presidency: his personality.76 As David Frum observed of Bush shortly before the war in Iraq:
“My judgement is, taken all in all, he’s a pretty impressive character, the right character for
now.”77
The president’s magnetism was on full display just days after the attacks, where,
bullhorn in hand, he addressed a gathering of first responders at Ground Zero. As Bush
strained through the muffled device, one rescue worker shouted, “I can’t hear you!” Bush
famously responded: “I can hear you! I can hear you! The rest of the world hears you! And
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the people — and the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon!”78
With one arm slung around the shoulder of firefighter Bob Beckwith, Bush paused for a
moment, no doubt absorbing the rapturous applause and patriotic cries of “USA! USA!
USA!” “Go get ‘em George!” bellowed another voice from the crowd. The scene captured
the national mood: a volatile mix of grief, patriotism and anger. One Washington Post poll
also indicated significant confusion over who orchestrated the attacks, with seventy-eight
percent of participants blaming Saddam Hussein.79 Bush was in no rush to correct the
misunderstanding.80 “Dad made a mistake not going into Iraq when he had an approval rating
in the nineties,” Bush disclosed to a family friend in 2000. “If I’m ever in that situation, I’ll
use it — I’ll spend my political capital.”81 True to his word, when the terrorist attacks
catapulted his public approval rating to ninety percent, Bush made the most of his own
political moment.
November 8, 2001. “We cannot know every turn this battle will take, yet we know our
cause is just and our ultimate victory assured. We will no doubt face new challenges, but we
have our marching orders,” Bush declared at the Georgia World Congress Center in Atlanta.
“My fellow Americans… let’s roll.”82 In the final words of Todd Beamer — who died in a
remarkable display of bravery onboard the hijacked United Airlines Flight 93 — Bush found
the mantra for his War on Terror. The phrase reflected Bush’s own philosophy as
commander-in-chief, as Woodward observed, “his instincts are almost his second religion…
He was the ‘gut player,’ the ‘calcium-in-the-backbone’ leader who operated on the principle
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of ‘no doubt.’”83 “If Bush believed something was right,” David Satterfield added, “he
believed it would succeed. Its very rightness ensured ultimate success. Democracy and
freedom were right. Therefore, they would win out.”84 When journalist Helen Thomas
questioned Bush’s belief that Iraq would be better off without Hussein — retorting “That’s
not a reason to go to war” — Bush vented to his Press Secretary Ari Fleischer:
Did you tell her I don’t like motherfuckers who gas their own people? Did you
tell her I don’t like assholes who lie to the world? Did you tell her I’m going to
kick his sorry motherfucking ass all over the Mideast?85

A personal grievance appeared to drive Bush’s disdain for Hussein: “after all,” he later added
at the Senate, “this is the guy who tried to kill my dad.”86 And while Cheney held
reservations about the practicality of Bush’s vision to oust Hussein and install a democracy in
Iraq, he followed nonetheless, declaring during a debate in the Situation Room: “We’ve got a
genuine obligation to go stand up a democracy… We’ve got to fundamentally change the
place. And we’ve got to give the Iraqi people a chance at those fundamental values we
believe in.”87 It was the Bush Doctrine at its most idealistic, the United States resorting to war
for the good of the world. The memory of heroes like Beamer further aided in that perception.
In the years following his famous “bullhorn moment,” Bush did little to correct the
misguided public opinion that Hussein was personally involved in the terrorist attacks.
Indeed, months into America’s occupation of Iraq, still sixty-nine percent of the American
public believed Hussein played a role in the operation.88 This belief owed much to the
associative logics consistently deployed by Bush in his public communications, which
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suggested a loose connection between the two.89 “The danger,” Bush explained to reporters
on September 25, 2002, “is that al-Qaeda becomes an extension of Saddam’s madness and his
hatred and his capacity to extend weapons of mass destruction around the world… You can’t
distinguish between al-Qaeda and Saddam when you talk about the war on terror.” 90 The
following month, in his “Address to the Nation Concerning the Threat of Iraq,” Bush
reminded the public of the threat Hussein posed:
We also must never forget the most vivid events of recent history. On September
the 11th, 2001, America felt its vulnerability — even to threats that gather on the
other side of the earth. We resolved then, and we are resolved today, to confront
every threat, from any source, that could bring sudden terror and suffering to
America.91

He added: “We know that after September 11, Hussein’s regime gleefully celebrated the
terrorist attacks on America.” 92 Such thinly veiled appeals to fear and anger triggered
discernible shifts in public support for war with Iraq.93 The more Americans were subjected
to Bush administration rhetoric, Amy Gershkoff and Shana Kushner found, the more likely
they were “to perceive a strong connection between Hussein and terrorism, and thus more
likely to support the war in Iraq.”94 For this, Bush can only be credited so much.

89

Oliver Marchart, Das historisch-politische Gedächtnis. Für eine politische Theorie kollektiver
Erinnerung in Molden, Berthold. "Resistant pasts versus mnemonic hegemony: On the power relations of
collective memory." Memory Studies 9, no. 2 (2016): 127. Marchart explains collective memory “as a
layered field of sedimentations which’s contingent origin in the dispute of competing definitions of the
past has become forgotten, after a certain version of the past has imposed itself and become hegemonic.” It
is in human agency, Elizabeth Jelin adds, “that the past is activated. Memory is produced whenever there
are subjects who share a culture [and] social agents who try to materialize meanings of the past.” See
Elizabeth Jelin, State Repression and the Labors of Memory. (University of Minnesota Press, 2003) in
Molden, Resistant pasts, 127. In consistently conflating Iraq and the September 11 attacks, Bush actively
sought to – and succeeded in – shaping the collective memory of September 11 to suit his administration’s
geopolitical agenda.
90
Walter Pincus, “CIA Learned in ’02 That Bin Laden Had No Ties to Iraq,” The Washington Post
September 15, 2006. Accessed July 27th, 2019.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2006/09/15/cia-learned-in-02-that-bin-laden-had-noiraq-ties-report-says/097f75d8-b7fe-4186-bd7b-a8dc6e7a45ba/
91
George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the Threat of Iraq,” American Rhetoric, October 7, 2002.
Accessed July 23, 2019. https://americanrhetoric.com/speeches/gwbushwariniraqcincinnati.htm
92
George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on the Threat of Iraq.”
93
Amy Gershkoff and Shauna Kushner. "Shaping public opinion: The 9/11-Iraq connection in the Bush
administration's rhetoric." Perspectives on Politics 3, no. 3 (2005): 531.
94
Gershkoff and Kushner, “Shaping public opinion,” 531.

50

When Bush’s actions did not match his rhetoric, Cheney acted unilaterally. On August
16, 2002, The New York Times published a story detailing growing dissent within the
Republican ranks over Iraq, arguing that the “administration had neither adequately prepared
for military action nor made the case that it is needed.” The article also noted Brent
Scowcroft’s opinion that “an attack on Iraq… would seriously jeopardize, if not destroy, the
global counter-terrorist campaign we have undertaken.”95 Frustrated with the president’s
forbearance under pressure, Woodward observed, “Cheney decided that everyone was
offering an opinion except the administration. There was no stated administration position
and he wanted to put one out, make a big speech if necessary.” At a National Security
Council meeting, Cheney dictated to Bush, “I’m going to give that speech.”
“Don’t get me in trouble,” the characteristically nonchalant president responded. Less than
two weeks later, Cheney delivered a speech to the Veterans of Foreign Wars national
convention in Nashville, Tennessee, detailing the threat Hussein posed to modern America:
If the United States could have pre-empted 9/11, we would have, no question.
Should we be able to prevent another, much more devastating attack, we will, no
question. This nation will not live at the mercy of terrorists or terror regimes…
Simply stated, there is no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass
destruction. There is no doubt he is amassing them to use against our friends,
against our allies, and against us.96

These comments, writes Woodward, “just short of a declaration of war, were widely
interpreted as administration policy.”97 “My understanding is that the president himself was
very surprised by that speech,” recalled a former senior administration official. “It had the
effect of somewhat limiting the president’s options.”98 In order to garner the trust of the
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international community, however, the administration needed — to quote the now infamous
words of George Tenet — a “slam dunk.”99 Only one figure within the administration held
the international clout necessary to deliver the case convincingly.
The hawkish public relations campaign reached a fever pitch on February 5, 2003.
Only this time, it was the largely estranged Colin Powell presenting the administration’s case
for war to the United Nations (UN), not Bush, Cheney or Rumsfeld. “The reason I went to the
UN,” Powell later recalled in an interview with Jason Breslow, was “because we needed to
put the case before the entire international community in a powerful way, and that’s what I
did.”100 Wilkerson believed Powell was selected for the job because of his popularity,
observing, “They’re putting him out in the front of the fox hole, because he’s the one with all
the credits... He’s got the credibility. That’s the reason he’s doing it.101 Just two days before
Powell’s speech, sixty-three percent of the American public said they trusted him over Bush,
and ninety percent reported that his presentation would determine their support for the war.102
A topic of derision among administration hardliners, Powell’s popularity came to benefit his
detractors at a pivotal juncture.103 Despite his reservations, particularly pertaining to the
veracity of the intelligence provided by the war-hungry Cheney and Rumsfeld, Powell —
whom Wilkerson described as “the world’s most loyal soldier” — delivered the
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presentation.104 He later described the speech as a “painful” and “lasting blot on his
record.”105
February 5, 2003. “Every statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid
sources. These are not assertions. What we're giving you are facts and conclusions based on
solid intelligence,” Powell opened to the United Nations Security Council.106 Behind the
scenes, however, Powell lacked conviction, as Paul Pillar remembered of the intelligence:
Yeah, it [was] crap. And the secretary apparently had similar views. It was just
garbage. ‘And Zarqawi was here [Iraq], at this point, so that means he was being
controlled by the regime!’ It was all a bunch of nonsense… The whole purpose
was to create an impression that was contrary to professional judgments. 107

Powell’s mention of Abu Musab Al Zarqawi as the nucleus of a “sinister nexus between Iraq
and the al-Qaeda terror network” formed the only tenuous link between Iraq and the terrorist
attacks. In actuality, Zarqawi was considered a relatively marginal figure within the broader
scheme of Islamic terrorism, and no corroborating evidence existed of a relationship between
himself and the regime in Baghdad. 108 The priority, however, was to establish a connection
between Hussein and the 9/11 attacks on the world stage in a manner that, Bush directed,
even “‘Joe Public’ could understand.”109 A connection between the two legitimized the
currency the Bush administration so often traded in: fear. If anyone could make that case
successfully, it was the immensely respected Powell: his speech to the UN triggered a thirtypoint jump in the number of Americans “who felt convinced of a link between Hussein and
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al-Qaeda.”110 In his complicity, Powell significantly contributed to the misguided public
opinion that Hussein was tied to the terrorist attacks. “It was the old general’s ultimate
sacrifice as a good soldier,” Tom Ricks concluded of the UN speech, “the first casualty of the
Iraq War.”111
Even Powell, however, failed to judge the extent to which the administration had
abandoned factuality. The intelligence report provided to him, Robert Draper observes,
“amounted to semi-educated guesses built on previous and seldom-challenged guesses…
[CIA] analysts knew not to present these judgements as facts. But that distinction had become
lost by the time Powell spoke.”112 Bush and his inner circle cared less for the veracity of
flawed intelligence than spinning it to meet geopolitical ends. “Look, in about five weeks I
may have to ask fathers and mothers to send their sons and daughters off to war,” Bush told
CIA deputy director John McLaughlin, after he delivered a less than inspiring first draft of
the speech to the president in the Oval Office. “It needs to be more convincing,” he was told.
When asked for “undeniable” evidence of a “smoking gun” to go after Hussein, however,
chemical weapons analyst Larry Fox simply replied: “Ah. Well no. We don’t have any.”113
Despite the absence of a smoking gun, Bush demanded Tenet and McLaughlin
construct a more “convincing case.” “Give me everything you’ve got,” one analyst working
on the project was told, “never mind sourcing or other problems.”114 Despite personal
reservations, Powell was assured by Tenet that the intelligence sourced from the National
Intelligence Estimate was solid. “Mr. Secretary, I fear my oversight committees more than I
fear your ire if I’m wrong! I’m not wrong,” Tenet reassured Powell shortly before the
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presentation.115 Not only was Tenet wrong; the CIA had deliberately presented unreliable
intelligence to make the administration’s case for war. When one analyst expressed concern
over the integrity of the agency’s primary source, known as Curveball, he was told: “Let’s
keep in mind the fact that this war’s going to happen regardless of what Curveball said or
didn’t say, and that the Powers That Be probably aren’t terribly interested in whether
Curveball knows what he’s talking about.” Apparently, the integrity of the truth paled in
comparison to crafting the desired narrative: “we were all infected in the case for war,” one
intelligence official recalled.116 Left untreated, that infection soon became an epidemic,
inspiring war irrespective of the truth.
March 19, and After
“There is no group in America that can withstand the force of an aroused public opinion.”
Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 16, 1933.
March 19, 2003. “My fellow citizens. At this hour, American and coalition forces are in
the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the
world from grave danger,” Bush calmly declared from his desk in the Oval Office. “Our
nation enters this conflict reluctantly, yet our purpose is sure. The people of the United States
and our friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens peace
with weapons of mass murder.”117 For months, administration officials stressed the urgent
need to invade Iraq: “We don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud,” Condoleezza
Rice repeated to Wolf Blitzer on CNN.118 In total, Operation Iraqi Freedom cost eight-
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hundred and fifteen billion dollars… with no weapons of mass destruction to show for it.119
Post-war findings revealed that Iraq had suspended its nuclear weapons program in 1991,
which Hussein made no attempt to revive — although he did make consistent efforts to hide
that fact from the UN and the United States.120 To the American public, however, Iraq was
always about more than finding weapons of mass destruction: days into the occupation,
eighty-two percent said they supported the war, regardless of whether WMDs were found.121
Nationwide, there persisted a notion that Saddam was somehow tied to the 9/11 attacks — a
perception the administration did little to challenge. Whether the public believed Hussein was
personally involved in the first attacks, or feared he would orchestrate a second, the memory
of September 11 played a key role in justifying the war in Iraq.
From the moment the planes hit the World Trade Center, Bush and his inner circle
recognized an unrivalled opportunity to hit an old foe under new pretences. This desire,
which preceded the terrorist attacks, shifted the focus of the war on terrorism from the elusive
al-Qaeda regime to the easily located “axis of evil.” The driving force was the memory of
September 11, as George Tenet determined in his memoir, At the Center of the Storm:
After 9/11, everything changed. Many foreign policy issues were now viewed
through the prism of smoke rising from the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
For many in the Bush administration, Iraq was unfinished business. They seized
on the emotional impact of 9/11 and created a psychological connection between
the failure to act decisively against al-Qaeda and the danger posed by Iraq’s
WMD programs… Had 9/11 not happened, the argument to go to war in Iraq
undoubtedly would have been much harder to make. 122
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Still, selling the war required a concerted marketing campaign. Andrew Card, then White
House Chief of Staff, spelled out the administration’s strategy for selling the war in an
interview with the Times on September 7, 2002: “From a marketing point of view you don’t
introduce new products in August.”123 Instead, the White House determined, the first
anniversary of the 9/11 attacks “was a more optimal time to promote the new product.”124
The tangible national grief elicited by memorialization efforts became valuable capital in
spinning the Iraq War. At his speech in Cincinnati, just a month later, Bush argued:
Some citizens wonder, after 11 years of living with this problem, why do we need
to confront it now? And there's a reason. We've experienced the horror of
September the 11th. We have seen that those who hate America are willing to
crash airplanes into buildings full of innocent people. Our enemies would be no
less willing, in fact, they would be eager, to use biological or chemical, or a
nuclear weapon.125

This argument was bolstered by a New York Times article published that same day, in which
columnist William Safire regurgitated the narrative that ousting Hussein was a necessity
given Iraq’s ties to al-Qaeda.126 These hints at Hussein’s culpability created understandable
public confusion. “You get a general fuzz going around,” John Mueller observed. “People
know they don't like al-Qaeda, they are horrified by September 11, they know this guy
[Saddam] is a bad guy, and it's not hard to put those things together.”127 Indeed, in many of
his speeches, Bush placed them together for the American public himself.128
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The domestic media did little to clear the rhetorical haze. As one resident of
Plymouth, Indianapolis confessed, her “gut-feeling” of a relation between the two was
conditioned by the news: “From what we’ve heard from the media… it seems like what they
feel is that Saddam and the whole al-Qaeda thing are connected.” 129 By late 2004, both the
Washington Post and New York Times, issued public apologies for failing to adequately
scrutinize administration discourse. Former Post editor Howard Kurtz assessed that, in the
year leading up to Bush’s declaration of war, the Post published “one-hundred and forty
front-page pieces making the administration’s case for war… The result was that coverage, in
hindsight, looks strikingly one-sided.” 130 This support for administration narratives, Antony
DiMaggio observes, created a “distorted political-media discourse… in favor of government
‘spin.’”131 As Bush so strikingly warned after the terrorist attacks: “you’re either with us, or
you’re with the terrorists.”132 In the patriotic fervour hastened by the terrorist attacks, national
media outlets picked ‘us’— they paid with an unwitting complicity.
In Jean Giraudoux’s The Trojan War Will Not Take Place, Greek commander Ulysses
remarks to the war-weary Trojan military commander Hector: “There’s a kind of permission
for war which can be given only by the world’s mood and atmosphere, the feel of its pulse. It
would be madness to undertake war without that permission.”133 After September 11, the
Bush administration recognized opportunity in tragedy, and capitalized upon a national mood
particularly conductive to war: fear, anger and intolerance. On March 10, 2003, the Dixie
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Chicks became a lightning-rod for the nation’s rage after lead singer Natalie Maines decried
to a crowd in London: “Just so you know, we do not want this war, this violence. And we’re
ashamed the President of the United States is from Texas.”134 In a week, sales for the group’s
number-one single, Travelin’ Soldier, declined by forty-two percent. Fox News’s Bill
O’Reilly branded the group “callow foolish women who deserve to be slapped around.”135
The public responded in kind, with one angered radio caller arguing: “they should send
[Maines] over to Iraq, strap her to a bomb and drop her over Baghdad.”136 When the Dixie
Chicks opened their tour in South Carolina that May, Rep. Jay Lucas took aim at both the
band and their supporters, threatening, “I think we in South Carolina ought to say goodbye to
the Dixie Chicks. Anybody that thinks about going to that concert ought to be ready, ready,
ready to run away from it.”137 For their dissent, the Dixie Chicks became the foremost
example of what happens when you speak out against a good war. While it is true that figures
within the Bush administration desired war with Hussein long before the attacks, it is equally
true that much of the American public supported Bush and the war effort.138 Without that
support, it would have been impossible for the administration to extend its foreign policy
doctrine to Iraq.
Conclusion
When the administration’s WMD theory proved hollow, the only legitimate reason for
a national presence in Iraq was the humanitarian cause. As Robert Jervis observes, “the war

134

Barbra Kopple and Cecilia Peck. Dixie Chicks: Shut Up and Sing. (The Weinstein Company, 2006)
Kopple and Peck, Dixie Chicks: Shut Up and Sing.
136
Kopple and Peck, Dixie Chicks: Shut Up and Sing.
137
Jay Lucas quoted in Amy Edgar, “House Resolution asks Dixie Chicks for free show for troops.”
Beaumont Enterprise, March 18, 2003. https://www.beaumontenterprise.com/news/article/Houseresolution-asks-Dixie-Chicks-for-free-show-753614.php.
138
“In Depth: Topics A-Z: Iraq.” Gallup https://news.gallup.com/poll/1633/iraq.aspx. At the beginning of
the Iraq War, seventy-five percent of Americans believed sending troops to Iraq was “not a mistake,”
while sixty-seven percent did not believe the Bush administration misled the public about whether Iraq had
weapons of mass destruction. From March 22 to April 22, those who favoured U.S. war with Iraq stood at
seventy percent.
135

59

[in Iraq] is hard to understand if the only objective was to disarm Saddam… But if changing
the Iraqi regime was expected to bring democracy and stability to the Middle East,
discourage tyrants and energize reformers throughout the world, and demonstrate the
American willingness to provide a high degree of what it considers world order whether
others like it or not, then as part of a larger project, the war makes sense.” 139 The fear elicited
by the 9/11 attacks created new opportunities to extend American hegemony under the guise
of humanitarian interventionism. It was certainly a radical departure from the humble foreign
policy championed by Bush on the election trail. As the inner-dynamics of the Bush
administration testify, the Bush Doctrine was, in actuality, the Bush-Cheney-Rumsfeld
Doctrine. For all three, Hussein was a problem in need of solving — irrespective of the
terrorist attacks. The war on terrorism was a good one because it allowed the administration
to strike under largely moral pretences: even if that did rely on deliberate misrepresentations
of Hussein’s ties to al-Qaeda, or his ability to deploy weapons of mass destruction.
The sanctimonious tone of the war, however, was largely a product of Bush alone. In
his communications with the public, Bush consistently framed the Iraq conflict as a divinely
sanctioned mission, much like he viewed his own presidency. Any explanation of Iraq as a
good war must account for that idiosyncratic evangelical perspective. In 2004, David Frum
observed: “The Islamic world has lagged further and further behind the Christian West… By
a poignant coincidence, the decade in which the Arab and Muslim Middle East tumbled into
economic stagnation and mass mutual slaughter was the same decade in which the United
States hurtled into one of its periodic technological sprints.”140 His viewpoint reflected
Bush’s own: that the war on terrorism was a clash of civilizations, not only intended to spread
democracy but to exterminate evil and barbarism; to extend the enlightenment of American
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ideals to the Iraqi people. To Bush, the war in Iraq was more than a good war, it was a
mission from God.
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CHAPTER III
BAD APPLES AND ROGUE SOLDIERS: THE ‘GOD WAR’ AND ITS DEFEAT AT ABU
GHRAIB
We’re on a Mission from God
I don’t think you can get at [George W.] Bush and his decision-making style,
and some of the decisions he's made, without thinking about the evangelical
aspect, without thinking about the spiritual aspect, in the sense that he gets
advice from a higher authority.
-

Lawrence Wilkerson, Former Chief of Staff to Colin Powell, 2008.1

December 13, 1999. “What political philosopher or thinker do you most identify with
and why?” WHO-TV anchor John Bachman posed to the GOP candidates gathered in Des
Moines, Iowa, for the Republican presidential debate. The day prior, Alan Keyes attacked
Bush, the front runner, for avoiding the “greatest moral crisis” facing the nation. “Issues like
abortion,” Keyes lamented, “have to be addressed up-front.”2 Commentators agreed that Des
Moines represented a critical juncture for Bush: a chance to “prove he’s as good as his
numbers tell us he is,” Charles Jones remarked, “to show he lives up to what those numbers
represent.”3 In response to Bachman’s question, Keyes offered the founding fathers, noting
that a “return to the original constitution they gave us” meant the public would no longer rely
“on nice politicians like Mr. Bush, or bad politicians like Bill Clinton.”4 In a characteristic
display of quick-witted humour, Bush retorted, “at least he called me nice.”
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Bachman returned, “Governor Bush, a philosopher-thinker, and why?”
“Christ, because he changed my heart,” Bush responded, resolutely. “When you turn your
heart and your life over to Christ, when you accept Christ as the saviour, it changes your
heart — changes your life. And that’s what happened to me.”5 After a small passage of
silence, the crowd gathered at the Greater Des Moines Civic Center erupted in applause. “It
struck lots of ordinary people who said grace before a meal… and turned to their Maker in
times of need as being sincere, and revealing of who Bush really was,” campaign strategist
Karl Rove remembered.6 The reply demonstrated the centrality of Evangelical Christianity to
the New Right, the Republican Party and Bush himself.7
The Des Moines debate, like the whole election, polarized viewers. Dan Baiz and
David Von Drehle of the Washington Post applauded Bush’s strong showing, observing, “he
appeared more aggressive in presenting his views, casting himself as… a man with strong
conservative convictions.”8 Bill Kristol, then editor of the Weekly Standard, warned that
Bush’s pious response was revealing of “a kind of narcissism.” “It is inappropriate,” he
argued, “as a matter of public philosophy to appeal to a private religious experience.”9 For
Bush, however, the realms of faith and politics were one and the same.10 In his
autobiography, Bush recounted his motivation for entering the presidential race after a
“rousing sermon” by Pastor Mark Craig in Austin, Texas:
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People are ‘starved for leadership,’ Pastor Craig said, ‘starved for leaders who
have ethical and moral courage.’ It is not enough to have an ethical compass to
know right from wrong, he argued. America needs leaders who have the moral
courage to do what is right for the right reason. It’s not always easy or convenient
for leaders to step forward, he acknowledged. Remember, even Moses had
doubts.11

While his detractors condemned the impromptu answer at Des Moines as a transparent appeal
to Iowa’s evangelical base, Bush fundamentally believed that his service as commander-inchief was tied to his faith. Born again as an evangelical Christian in 1985, his journey to the
presidency was grounded in a narcissistic belief that he was chosen to lead by God. “I’ve
heard the call,” Bush disclosed to televangelist James Robinson and his audience in 1999, “I
believe God wants me to run for President.”12
Those closest to Bush were privy to his evangelical inclinations. In a memorandum
addressing his staff as governor, Bush encouraged they pause upon entering his office to
observe his favourite piece of artwork by W. H. D. Koerner. The painting depicted a
horseman, fearlessly scaling a rugged mountainside, pioneering a path for those behind him.
“What adds complete life to the painting for me,” Bush added, “is the message of Charles
Wesley that we serve One greater than ourselves.”13 This philosophy anchored the Bush
White House culture, as David Frum recalled, the very first words he heard upon entering the
building were “missed you at bible study.”14 Koerner’s painting, which Bush took with him
to the Oval Office, was indicative of the leader he aspired to be; the righteous and doubtless
leader his pastor advocated for. When al-Qaeda operatives flew two commercial airliners into
the World Trade Center, Bush unsurprisingly assessed the crisis through the prism of his
faith. Upon hearing the news that a third plane had hit the Pentagon, he retreated to his
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presidential cabin on-board Air Force One to pray for wisdom and courage.15 His faith would
play an instrumental role in framing the impending conflict.
That evening, Bush promised retribution to the nation. “The search is underway for
those who were behind these evil acts,” he explained in a televised address from the Oval
Office. “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and
those who harbor them.” Bush concluded with Psalm 23: “Even though I walk through the
valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil for you are with me.” The comfort of Christian
doctrines surely resonated with the predominantly Christian population of America, as they
did with Bush himself.16 “There is no textbook on how to steady a nation rattled by a faceless
enemy,” Bush recounted in his memoir, Decision Points:
I found solace in reading the Bible, which Abraham Lincoln called ‘the best gift
God has given to man.’ I admired Lincoln’s moral clarity and resolve. The clash
between freedom and tyranny, he said, was ‘an issue which can only be tried by
war, and by decided victory.’ The war on terror would be the same. 17

This unyielding faith in America’s exceptional cause cast the war on terrorism in black-andwhite terms: good versus evil; right versus wrong; democracy versus tyranny.18 Intervention
in Iraq then became about more than the threat of weapons of mass destruction. “I understood
why people might disagree on the threat Hussein posed to the United States,” Bush recalled
of anti-war sentiment on the home front. “But I didn’t see how anyone could deny that
liberating Iraq advanced the cause of human rights.”19 Americans largely agreed: at the
launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom, seventy-three percent of the public viewed the war as
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morally justified. 20 Guided by Bush’s pious discourse, Americans largely agreed that the
nation was engaged in a good war.
Ousting Hussein, Bush argued both publicly and privately, was a faith-driven
undertaking. “I am driven with a mission from God,” Bush disclosed to Palestinian foreign
minister Nabil Shaath four months after invading Iraq. “God would tell me ‘George, go and
end the tyranny in Iraq.’ And I did.”21 The administration’s demonization of Hussein heavily
relied on the dictator’s adoption of torture practices, which Bush condemned as a “grave
violation of human rights.” At his State of the Union Address in 2003, Bush painted a
damning portrait of Hussein’s Ba’ath Party:
Iraqi refugees tell us how forced confessions are obtained — by torturing children
while their parents are made to watch. International human rights groups have
catalogued other methods used in the torture chambers of Iraq: electric shock,
burning with hot irons, dripping acid on the skin, mutilation with electric drills,
cutting out tongues, and rape. If this is not evil, then evil has no meaning.22

Stories emerging from the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad, Iraq’s largest detention facility,
testified to the brutality of Hussein’s dictatorship.23 “They had a game,” Abdallah Ahmed, a
survivor of the prison recounted, “they made people drink gasoline, then put them out in open
ground and fired guns at them.”24 The family of Naji Abbas, who went missing after a trip to
the local store, were ordered by police to retrieve his body from the prison thirteen months
later. When they arrived, they found a battered corpse: one eye missing; a broken arm; and
severe burns to the chest from electrical wires. They were then ordered to pay a substantial
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sum for the bullets used to kill him.25 It was hardly challenging to broadcast the regime as
barbaric, nor Hussein as evil incarnate. Operation Iraqi Freedom, Bush promised, would
liberate Iraqis from the shackles of fear and tyranny.
Bush rightly depicted Hussein as a ruthless and wholly irredeemable autocrat. Like
the horseman in Koerner’s painting, Bush was resolute in the moral necessity of ousting
Hussein and liberating Iraq. To his detractors in the White House, however, Koerner’s work
prompted concern: they see a “lone, arrogant cowboy plunging recklessly ahead, paying little
heed to danger… listening to no voice but his own,” wrote David Gergen. “That he believes
he is doing the Lord’s work only increases their apprehension. He’s not taking us up a
mountain, they fear, but over a cliff.”26 Despite Bush’s seemingly noble intentions, many
now view his war in Iraq as doing exactly that. After images of American torture at the Abu
Ghraib prison were broadcast worldwide on April 28, 2004, American support for the war,
and Bush, declined. Abu Ghraib’s strongest effect, Eric Voeten and Paul Brewer note, “was
on evaluations of Bush’s job performance on Iraq, which declined by an estimated 6.1
percentage points as a consequence of the scandal.” 27 By the end of his tenure as president,
the majority of the American public believed the war to be a mistake. 28
In John Landis’ The Blues Brothers, Jake and Elwood Blues, played by John Belushi
and Dan Aykroyd, embark on a journey to save their Catholic orphanage from foreclosure.
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“We’re on a mission from God,” Aykroyd’s Elwood calmly remarks, as the brothers wreak
chaos in a high-speed pursuit with police. Addressing a Palestinian delegation at the Egyptian
resort of Sharm el-Sheikh, Bush described his invasion of Iraq in near-identical terms.29 His
comments were reflective of the narcissism Kristol flagged at Des Moines. Time and again,
Bush held America’s geopolitical cause to be not only morally, but divinely sanctioned. The
conflict, he suggested, was more than a good war — it was God’s war. “The liberty we prize
is not America’s gift to the world, but God’s gift to humanity,” Bush declared shortly before
the invasion of Iraq. Such rhetoric ensured that, when images of American torture emerged,
the fall would be swift and hard. “Shamefully,” Ted Kennedy declared from the Senate floor,
“we now learn that Saddam's torture chambers reopened under new management — U.S.
management.”30 Despite this embarrassingly public contradiction to his crusade against
Hussein, Bush refused to be held accountable for a scandal which was, undeniably,
symptomatic of his own self-appointed mission.
Bad Apples and Rogue Soldiers
“They that govern the most make the least noise.”
John Selden, Table Talk, 1686.31
May 5, 2004. “Don, someone’s head has to roll on this one,” Bush remarked to
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld after images of American torture emerged from the Abu
Ghraib prison near Baghdad.32 The story garnered widespread media attention after 60
Minutes II aired a news segment detailing cases of detainee abuse at the notorious prison,
including excerpts from an Army investigative report, headed by General Antonio Taguba.
Taguba determined that, in Tier 1-A of the prison, “numerous incidents of sadistic, blatant
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and wanton criminal abuses were inflicted on detainees.”33 Explicit photographs evidencing
the crimes, all taken by the culprits themselves, were shocking. In one, Specialist Charles
Graner, of the 372nd Military Police (MP) Company, signals a thumbs-up as naked detainees
form a human pyramid. In another, Private Lynndie England, of the same company, smirks
alongside a naked detainee, who has been forced to masturbate. The scandal threatened to
corrode the moral righteousness underpinning the war effort. “We’re not going to recover
from this damage,” Congressman John Murtha lamented. “This one incident destroyed our
credibility in Iraq.”34 In a public admission of guilt, Secretary of State Powell likened the
scandal to the My Lai massacre, conceding, “in war these sorts of horrible things happen
every now and again, but they’re still to be deplored.”35 Others within the administration,
wary of the disastrous impact the scandal might have on the war, shifted the blame entirely.
Rumsfeld, privately at least, was not one of them.36 On May 5, he handed the
president a hand-written letter of resignation, hoping that it “might demonstrate
accountability on the part of the United States government.”37 Bush refused it. Five days
later, Rumsfeld submitted a second, insisting, “I have concluded that the damage from the
acts of abuse that happened on my watch, by individuals whose conduct I am ultimately
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responsible for, can best be responded to by my resignation.”38 Bush again disagreed. Later
that day, in a public appearance, he remarked to Rumsfeld, “You’re doing a superb job. You
are a strong secretary of defense, and our nation owes you a debt of gratitude.”39 It was a
profound display of public loyalty, typical of a commander-in-chief who valued the trait
above all else.40 It was also an act of self-preservation. A change at the Pentagon, Cheney
advised Bush, “would be seen as an expression of doubt and hesitation” on Iraq. It would
only serve to embolden critics of the war, he argued, who would soon come for the president
himself.41 With the scandal drawing international condemnation, Bush and his advisers found
themselves in an administration-defining public relations battle. The retention of Rumsfeld
was a signal of intent — a repudiation of governmental culpability. Instead, White House
officials posited, the scandal was the product of a few “bad apples”— the officers caught in
the crosshairs of the camera lens.42 It was not a hard case to make.
Addressing a justifiably outraged Iraqi public on May 5, Bush promised swift and
resolute justice for the transgressions at Abu Ghraib. “People in Iraq must understand that I
view those practices as abhorrent,” Bush solemnly declared in an interview with Arabic-
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language channel Alhurra. “Those mistakes will be investigated, and people will be brought
to justice.” When quizzed on the potential resignation of Rumsfeld — who unbeknownst to
viewers submitted his first resignation earlier in the day — Bush expressed “confidence in the
Secretary of Defense.” “We’re finding the few that wanted to try and stop progress toward
freedom and democracy,” he explained.43 Specialist Graner, who became the face of the
scandal in the media, guaranteed even less public sympathy for the military police involved.
The Los Angeles Times described Graner as a “monstrous creep” guilty of abusing his exwife, Staci, who filed three protective orders against him. It was not hard to match Graner’s
morally reprehensible private life to the images of him beating detainees at Abu Ghraib.44
With a record of defiance dating back to his time as a prison guard, he certainly fit Cheney’s
description of the culprits as “rogue soldiers.”45 The demonization of Graner, and by
extension the 372nd MP Company, offered a seemingly simple solution to inflammatory
circumstances.
The half-witted apology on Alhurra proved entirely unconvincing in the Arab states.
“They will not be persuaded,” Arab League ambassador Ali Muhsen Hamid professed. “They
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don’t trust Americans.”46 In the Arabic world, Helga Tawil-Souri writes, the images from
Abu Ghraib were indicative of the more “symbolic” aspects of the war in Iraq — as “torture
and abuse directed towards the Arab and Muslim man.”47 Fouad Ajami, then director of
Middle Eastern studies at Johns Hopkins, agreed: “This has become for many of these Arabs
watching us and watching our war in Iraq, it's a referendum for them on the war.” The
administration’s defense did little to temper interpretations of the scandal as symbolic of
broader abuses of power in the region. For most, Ajami observed, “It’s an evil policy in Iraq,
not evil soldiers… what happened in Abu Ghraib… renders naked the American position in
the Arab world.”48 Despite the administration’s best efforts to pin the scandal on the 372nd
MP Company — including a campaign of Arabic network interviews conducted by General
Mark Kimmitt — the damage was done.49 “I don’t believe what Bush has promised,”
Dhurgan Khalid, a resident of Baghdad, concluded. “I don’t believe the people that did this
will go to jail. I don’t even believe they will face justice.”50
Domestically, the scandal became a referendum on the administration. On May 8,
2004, The Economist published a cover story titled “Resign, Rumsfeld” — accompanied by
an image of a prison detainee attached to electrical wires. Two weeks later, former Vice
President Al Gore delivered a scathing speech on the international position of the United
States at New York University. “How did we get from September 12th, 2001, when a leading
French newspaper ran a giant headline with the words ‘We Are All American Now’ and we
had the good will and empathy of the world — to the horror that we all felt in witnessing the
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pictures of torture at Abu Ghraib?” he questioned.51 Describing the inner conflict expressed
by Specialist Graner — who had reportedly said: “The Christian in me says it’s wrong, but
the Corrections Officer says, ‘I love to make a grown man piss on himself’” — Gore attacked
the Bush administration’s degradation of Christian values. “What happened at the prison,” he
declared, “was a natural consequence of the Bush administration policy which has dismantled
those wise [Christian] constrains and made war on America’s checks and balances.” Gore
then called for the resignation of six high-ranking officials, including Rumsfeld, Rice and
Tenet.52 In the face of mounting domestic and international scrutiny, Rumsfeld believed that
his resignation might “allow the administration and the Iraqi people to move beyond the
scandal.”53 Even after administration officials believed him to be a political liability,
however, Rumsfeld presented Bush with a quandary.54 To accept accountability at the highest
levels of government would render Bush vulnerable to criticism — vulnerable to charges that
the administration had deserted the Christian values Bush often championed. The resignation
of Rumsfeld offered no clear solution to that issue.
General Taguba’s report indicated that the abuses at Abu Ghraib were a consequence
of administration policy. Taguba concluded that the military police were, in fact, directed to
“set the conditions” for interrogations by Military Intelligence (MI) and the CIA.55 The legal
stipulations for interrogations at the prison, which approved the use of stress positions,
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environmental manipulation, sleep management and military working dogs, were modelled
on Rumsfeld’s prior authorization of “aggressive interrogation techniques” on suspected alQaeda detainees. 56 “We just do what they want us to do,” Specialist Megan Ambuhl recalled.
“If they want us to PT (physical training — exercise to the point of exhaustion) the guy,
that’s what we do. If they want us to keep him up, that’s what we do.”57 Private England
added: “We thought [the abuse] was unusual, and weird and wrong, but when we first got
there, the example was already set, that’s what we saw, I mean, it was okay.” 58 The abuses at
Abu Ghraib did not occur in a vacuum: the Bush administration rendered hundreds of socalled “enemy combatants” through extraordinary rendition (illegal under international law)
to circumnavigate legal restrictions. As one federal court of appeals judge observed of the
program, “the U.S. officials involved… have not generally tortured detainees themselves;
instead, they outsourced it.”59 The actions of the military police at Abu Ghraib reflected the
normalization of degrading practices in Army detention facilities, a culture which filtered
through the chain of command.
The grim evidence of detainee abuse in the care of the military police concealed a far
more disconcerting reality in Iraq. In multiple instances, General Taguba found, members of
the military police were commended by superiors for “softening” up detainees for
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interrogations.60 However, Taguba added, the military police never participated in the
interrogations themselves. “Someone caught our administration with their pants down,”
Sargent Javal Davis, a culprit in the scandal, explained:
They’re pissed off at that… Torture didn’t happen in those photographs, that was
humiliation, that was softening up. Torture happened during the interrogations.
Guys going through interrogation, and they’re dead, and they were killed, and
they died. That’s where the torture happened. We don’t have any photographs of
that.61

Far from the influence of a few bad apples, the institutionalization of torture during the war
on terrorism started with Bush’s refusal to grant al-Qaeda and Taliban detainees the
protections afforded by the Geneva Convention.62 In tandem with Rumsfeld’s authorization
of aggressive interrogation policies, the Senate Armed Service Committee found, “what
followed was an erosion in standards dictating that detainees be treated humanely.”63 The
brutality captured on film testified to the culture of violence condoned by interrogators.64 The
images failed, however, to adequately convey the impossible situation facing the lower-
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ranking members of the 372nd MP Company.65 In a bid to document the abuse, the lowestranking officer on the midnight shift, Specialist Sabrina Harman, began taking pictures.
October 20, 2003. “I ended your letter last night because it was time to wake the MI
prisoners and ‘mess with them’ but it went too far, even I can’t handle what’s going on,”
Harman wrote to her partner, Kelly, from the Abu Ghraib prison. “I took more pictures now
to record what is going on… Kelly, it’s awful and you know how fucked I am in the head —
both sides of me think it’s wrong.”66 Harman’s attempts to document the abuses at Abu
Ghraib were misunderstood by many. “These pictures,” Sarah Boxer of the New York Times
denounced, are “war photography as tourist snapshots. Soldiers cheerfully tormenting their
captives for the camera.”67 Harman’s ill-advised smiling throughout the gallery made it
difficult, if not impossible, to separate her actions from the likes of Graner. However, at her
courts-martial, expert witness Stjepan Mestrovic reasoned that the smiling was indicative of
learned helplessness. Harman, he argued, scored “very high in anxiety, depression and
dependency, all of which would be consistent with… somebody smiling in a situation that is
very uncomfortable as a way to try to please others or to just get along.”68 There was
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certainly no indication that Harman took pleasure in the suffering of detainees — at times,
she actively intervened in their defense.69 Ironically, the images she hoped would put an end
to the abuse resulted in her own imprisonment.70 “Shame on the Army for putting an illequipped, ill-trained junior specialist in a position where she had to challenge her leadership
to do the right thing,” defence lawyer Frank Skinner denounced after Harman’s conviction.71
“They’re passing the buck, putting it all on the little kids,” Robin Harman, Sabrina’s mother,
added as Rumsfeld testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on May 7, 2004.
“That’s what makes me so mad.”72
Of all the images taken at the prison, arguably the most infamous captured Harman
posing over the distressed, ice-packed corpse of Manadel al-Jamadi. “I didn’t realize he had
just been murdered,” Harman recalled of the photograph. “I was curious at the time and
looking back I find it more on the line of me being an idiot. I don’t regret going in there, but I
regret not being more respectful. No, I did not have anything to do with his death.”73 In fact,
al-Jamadi died after being interrogated by the CIA, who subjected him to thirty minutes of
Palestinian hanging torture, a method prohibited by the Geneva Convention.74 “They [the
CIA] stressed him [al-Jamadi] out so bad that the man passed away,” Staff Sergeant Ivan
Frederick wrote to his family from the prison in November, 2003. “They put his body in a
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bag and packed him in ice for approximately twenty-four hours in the shower… The next
day, the medics came in and put his body in a stretcher, placed a fake IV in his arm and took
him away.”75 Without Harman’s pictures, the death would likely have passed unremarked. “It
was pretty much supposed to be hush hush,” recalled Specialist Jeffrey Frost, who aided in
the cover-up. “We didn’t want the word to be spread around.”76
Al-Jamadi’s distressed corpse symbolized the grisly consequences of decisions made
at the highest levels of government. According to multiple sources, ABC News reported, “it
was members of the National Security Council’s Principals Committee,” which included
Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, Powell and Tenet, who “not only discussed specific plans and
interrogation methods but approved them.”77 The full weight of criminal responsibility,
however, fell on the low-ranking officers caught on camera.78 “Sacrifice the little guys,”
Sargent Davis lamented. “That’s how they cover it up.”79
Conveniently, for many, the abuse at Abu Ghraib started, and ended, with the actions
of the 372nd MP Company. “They were all acting together in their own amusement,” Captain
Chris Graveline remarked after Harman’s conviction. “There was no justification for what
they did that night. [They took the pictures] so they could remember the night, so they could
laugh at these men.”80 The demonization of the 372nd MP Company provided a comforting
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answer to an unnerving question: had the United States adopted the barbarous practices it
once denounced? “These acts could not conceivably have been authorized by anyone in the
chain of command, nor could they have been part of an intelligence-gathering or interrogation
effort,” Rumsfeld defended in his memoir, Known and Unknown. “Rather, they were the
senseless crimes of a small group of prison guards who ran amok in the absence of adequate
supervision.”81 In a war founded upon America’s exceptionalism, it was far easier to blame a
few bad apples, than to accept the whole cart was rotten.
Far from a bad apple, however, Harman’s colleagues described her as a soldier
committed to the wellbeing of the Iraqis she connected with. During her time serving in Al
Hillah, before being reassigned to Abu Ghraib, Harman purchased a mattress and refrigerator
for a local family. “The people there were amazing,” Harman recalled of the Iraqi city, fortyfive minutes from Abu Ghraib. “They were important to me and I was around them almost
every day.”82 At her courts-martial, Captain Donald Reese, Harman’s superior officer in Al
Hillah, testified: “I judge a lot of things off how the kids react to people and they loved her
and looked forward to seeing her.”83 Few paused to consider why an otherwise timid and
caring soldier might contribute to the abuse of detainees — General Taguba did. He
concluded that the military police were “actively requested” by their superiors to “set the
physical and mental conditions for favourable interrogations,” and received no training on the
rules of the Geneva Convention.84 While the photographs from Abu Ghraib exposed the
world to the dark side of the war, they also implicitly solved the moral crisis, evident in the
smiles of the military police. Their demonization shielded the nation from a far more
disconcerting reality — that torture had become standard operating procedure.
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When General Taguba arrived in Baghdad for the investigation, he quickly
determined that the abuse at Abu Ghraib was systemic. “From what I knew,” Taguba
remembered, “troops just don’t take it upon themselves to initiate what they did without any
form of knowledge of the higher-ups.” However, the strict legal parameters imposed by the
investigation limited Taguba’s jurisdiction to the lower-ranking members of the military
police. “I was legally prevented from further investigation into higher authority,” he recalled.
“I was limited to a box.”85 For his forthright investigation, Taguba became yet another
casualty of the administration’s self-denial over the torture question. In January of 2006,
without reason, he was ordered to retire. “They always shoot the messenger,” Taguba
assessed. “I was being ostracized for doing what I do.”86 “I know that my peers in the Army
will be mad at me for speaking out,” he continued to the New Yorker’s Seymour Hersh. “But
the fact is that we violated the laws of land warfare in Abu Ghraib. We violated the Geneva
Convention. We violated our own principles… I believe, even today, that those civilian and
military leaders responsible should be held to account.”87 Despite occupying polar opposites
of the scandal, both Taguba and Harman suffered for exposing an issue which gravitated up
the chain of command. In the White House, at least, denying that possibility supplanted the
importance of unearthing the roots of the abuse.
On November 22, 2011, the Kuala Lumpur War Crimes Commission, established by
former Malaysian prime minister Mahathir Mohamad, determined that Bush, Cheney,
Rumsfeld and their legal advisers were all guilty of war crimes in Iraq.88 The tribunal heard
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the harrowing testimony of Jameelah Abbas Hameedi, a former detainee at Abu Ghraib, who
described being stripped, humiliated, and treated as a human shield while in the custody of
American forces.89 Despite the deciding being purely declaratory in nature, it articulated a
growing sense of frustration over the administration’s apparent impunity. “I think things that
they authorized probably fall within the area of war crimes,” Richard Clarke observed in an
interview with Democracy Now. “It’s clear that things that the Bush administration did — in
my mind, at least, were war crimes.”90 At Abu Ghraib, however, criminal responsibility fell
solely on the soldiers of the 372nd MP Company. From “the moment that the White House
accused the soldiers in the Abu Ghraib drama as ‘rotten apples,’” writes Ryan Caldwell,
“their fates were sealed, and the full horizon of possible explanations for the scandal was
closed with the exclusive focus on them, and not their superiors.”91 The cover they provided,
however, proved temporary. Any illusions of governmental innocence were shattered when
the Senate Select Intelligence Committee released its more-than six-thousand-page report on
the CIA’s use of torture during detainee interrogations.
Never Again? The Torture Report and The God War’s End
September 6, 2006. “This program has been, and remains, one of the most vital tools
in our war against the terrorists,” Bush concluded of the CIA’s Detention and Interrogation
Program from the East Room of the White House. “Were it not for this program, our
intelligence community believes that al-Qaeda and its allies would have succeeded in
launching another attack against the American homeland. By giving us information about
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terrorist plans we could not get anywhere else, this program has saved innocent lives.” 92 As
the fifth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks approached, Bush launched a public defense of the
detention program, and by proxy, his administration. “I want to be absolutely clear with our
people, and the world: The United States does not torture. It’s against our laws, and it’s
against our values,” Bush declared.93 In March of 2009, the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee, led by Senator Diane Feinstein, tested the president’s defense through a
comprehensive investigation into the detention and interrogation program. The damning final
report, made available to the public on December 9, 2014, revealed the brutality of American
practices during the war on terrorism. “Nobody wants to do something that is going to bring
on any kind of attack,” Feinstein reasoned from the Senate floor on December 9. “But I came
to the conclusion that America’s greatness is being able to say we made a mistake and we are
going to correct it and go from there.”94 Over a decade removed from the abuses at Abu
Ghraib, the so-called “Torture Report” shattered the “bad apple” narrative once and for all.
The report left little room for ambiguity. “It is my personal conclusion,” Feinstein
wrote, “that under the common meaning of the term, CIA detainees were tortured. I also
believe that the conditions of confinement and use of authorized and unauthorized
interrogation and conditioning techniques were cruel, inhumane and degrading. I believe the
evidence of this is overwhelming and incontrovertible.”95 Under Sections 2340-2340A of the
U.S. Criminal Code, torture is defined as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether
physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted for such purposes as obtaining… a confession.”96
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Investigators concluded that the “enhanced interrogation techniques” employed by the
agency, particularly waterboarding and sleep deprivation, resulted in severe physical and
mental harm.97 CIA officers, investigators found, “threatened at least three detainees with
harm to their families,” including “threats to harm the children of a detainee, threats to
sexually abuse the mother of a detainee, and a threat to cut a detainee’s mother’s throat.”98
Claims that such practices garnered actionable intelligence also proved false. Of the twenty
foremost examples of “purported counterterrorism successes that the CIA has attributed” to
the program, investigators concluded, all were “wrong in fundamental respects.”99 Not only
did the program undermine American values — it proved fruitless in the process.
The images from Abu Ghraib hinted at a darker side to the war on terrorism
unexposed to the American public. It proved far easier to blame the scandal on the actions of
a few bad apples than to accept the nation had turned its back on its core principles. The
Torture Report proved that, beyond reasonable doubt, the nation had resorted to torture
during the war — an unnerving but necessary reality to confront. Condemnation of such
practices was bipartisan. “People who have worn the uniform and had the experience know
that this terrible and odious practice [waterboarding] should never be condoned in the United
States,” Republican Senator John McCain remarked at Dordt College on October 25, 2007.
“We are a better nation than that.”100 Senator Feinstein, too, believed that transparency on
torture would benefit the nation. “My words give me no pleasure,” she avowed, “But history
will judge the nation by its commitment to a just society governed by law and the willingness
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to face an ugly truth and say, ‘Never again.’”101 The sentiment marked a stark departure from
previous conceptions of national exceptionalism, as Pease observes, “the fantasy of American
exceptionalism eradicated the difference between the national ideal citizens wanted and the
faulty nation they had, by representing America as already having achieved all that a nation
could be.” Humbled by the nation’s actions, figures like Feinstein and McCain repackaged
notions of American exceptionalism as a doctrine to aspire to — though not yet attained.102
From Woodrow Wilson to Franklin Roosevelt, there persists a notion throughout
American history that when America resorts to war, it does so in the interests of freedom,
democracy and faith. In approaching his war on terrorism, Bush remained consistent with his
predecessors, casting the conflict as a good war in both faith and morals. The images from
Abu Ghraib challenged those convictions on an international scale, and exposed that America
was perhaps especially susceptible to the evils of warfare given the Manichean origins of the
war itself. In her foreword to the Torture Report, Feinstein recognized that, after the 9/11
attacks, the CIA faced intense public pressure to prevent further attacks upon the nation.
“Nevertheless,” she commented, “such pressure, fear and expectation of further terrorist plots
do not justify, temper or excuse improper actions taken by individuals or organizations in the
name of national security.” The report, she hoped, demonstrated that, “regardless of the
pressures and the need to act, the intelligence community’s actions must always reflect who
we are as a nation and adhere to our laws and standards.”103 The document went public at a
critical juncture: American support for torture had incrementally swelled to a majority
position. 104 The report served as a timely reminder of the nation’s fundamental values —
values both Republicans and Democrats were keen to uphold.
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Conclusion
We are, as a matter of empirical fact and undeniable history, the greatest force
for good the world has ever known... We did not seek the position. It is ours
because of our ideals and our power, and the power of our ideals. In the words
of British historian Andrew Roberts, ‘In the debate over whether America was
born great, achieved greatness, or had greatness thrust upon her, the only
possible conclusion must be — all three.’
-

Dick Cheney, Exceptional: Why the World Needs a Powerful America, 2016.

The words of Dick Cheney in his most recent book, Exceptional, reflect a strain of
American exceptionalism central to the administration’s foreign policy. It is a sentiment
manifest throughout the Bush doctrine, with it’s “overriding sense that peace and stability
require the United States to assert its primacy in world politics.”105 As the abuse scandal at
Abu Ghraib and the systemic implementation of torture during the war on terrorism show,
however, the world requires both a powerful, and accountable, United States. As Pease
cautions, the history of American exceptionalism often fills the gaps between reality and
fantasy, displacing citizens’ “normal national desire — to achieve an ideal nation — with the
abnormal desire to propagate the U.S. model of nationalism.”106 The brutality on show at Abu
Ghraib certainly contradicted the promises made to the Iraqi people — that the United States
would liberate them from Hussein’s totalitarian regime. Certainly, for many Arabs watching,
it was one oppressor replacing another — a far cry from the sanctimonious rhetoric pushed
by Bush during his first term in office. While figures like Bush were willing to justify torture
through inflated claims regarding its effectiveness, figures like Feinstein and McCain were
willing to expose America’s failures to the world, with the hope that doing so would result in
a brighter future for the nation.
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There is something inherently paradoxical about Bush’s marriage of faith and warfare.
As Stanley Hauerwas writes, “if there is something to this Christian stuff, it must surely
involve the conviction that the Son would rather die on the cross than for the world to be
redeemed by violence… The defeat of death through the resurrection makes possible as well
as necessary that Christians live non-violently in a world of violence.” On his own response
to the terrorist attacks, Hauerwas, a Christian pacifist, wrote: “I confess it never crossed my
mind that… my response to September 11 [would be] quite different from that of the good
people who sing ‘God Bless America’— so different that I am left in saddened silence.”107
The war on terrorism thrived not on a commitment to God, but the nation. “Some have said
the most revealing remark about [Bush] was when he said he listened to a ‘higher father,’”
Lawrence Wilkerson expressed in an interview with Thomas Preston:
it’s my firm view, buttressed by some experience up close and personal, but more,
my thirty-five years in the government and understanding how these things work
bureaucratically, that oftentimes, the predisposition was influenced not by God,
but by Dick Cheney. And the fact that Dick Cheney is the most unprecedentedly
powerful vice president we’ve ever had. Steeped in defense, and militaryindustrial complex, congressional issues. The president isn’t. He’s the gray
eminence, if you will, the president isn’t. He’s the guy whose done foreign policy
before, national security policy, the president hasn’t… So, I think a lot of the
president’s predisposition was not necessarily, exclusively the vice president’s
influence, but if there was a single influence that hardened… rather than created
that predisposition, it was the vice president. 108

While the administration’s goals in Iraq were often articulated by Bush in terms of Christian
values, that commitment was rivalled only by Bush and Cheney’s subscription to a uniquely
American religion: American exceptionalism. The “bad apples” narrative demonstrated the
administration’s hope that, once again, the fantasy of America’s exceptionalism would paper
over the cracks of an unflattering reality, a reality wholly incongruous with the evangelical
tone of the war on terror. The images did, however, match the twisted vision of American
exceptionalism extended by the Bush Doctrine: a “drive towards an aggressive unilateralism
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in which the U.S. threatens to unravel the international system of institutions and legal
precedents built up over fifty years’… [including] the failure to abide by the Geneva
Conventions,” Neil MacMaster argues. 109 The scandal at Abu Ghraib, and the Torture Report
that followed, signal which system ultimately won out during the war on terrorism.
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EPILOGUE
While the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 destroyed buildings, they failed to
shake the nation’s understanding of itself. Indeed, in war, the nation reclaimed a familiar
wartime identity lost to the conclusion of the Cold War. “America is always at her best when
she is on a permanent war footing,” Stanley Hauerwas sardonically observed in 2002. “Bin
Laden has given Americans what they so desperately needed — a war without end. America
is a country that lives off the moral capital of our wars… Wars make clear we must believe in
something even if we are not sure what that something is, except that it has something to do
with the ‘American way of life.’”1 The rush to relate the post-9/11 moment to the good war
against fascism signals the centrality of warfare to configurations of national identity. The
good war reminded Americans of an exceptional past, and the nation’s duty to continue on in
that tradition through yet another conflict. There was little doubt over the role that America
would play on the world stage — much like the painting Bush so adored, America would lead
the way as “freedom’s defender.” “America did not change on September 11,” Robert Kagan
observed. “It only became more itself.”2
Throughout President Trump’s first term in office, scholars and journalists have
increasingly popularized the term “post-truth” to explain the current moment in American
politics.3 In the age of Trump, the president’s eagerness to hit his political opponents below

Hauerwas, “September 11, 2001: A Pacifist Response,” 430-31.
Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 2003): 85.
3
Ralph Keyes, The post-truth era: Dishonesty and deception in contemporary life. Macmillan, 2004. The
“post-truth era” Keyes explains, is an era in which “we don’t just have truth and lies but a third category of
ambiguous statements that are not exactly the truth but fall just short of a lie.” Numerous texts have been
published about post-truth politics since Trump’s ascendency to the presidency, as well as articles
published by the New York Times and Washington Post. While the term has been around since 2004,
Trump, and his over 20,000 false claims since becoming president, of course lend new meaning to the term
and its relevancy to contemporary politics.
1
2
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the belt, and dismissal of criticism as “fake news,” has resulted in a distorted political-media
discourse where public attitudes reign supreme and facts rarely matter. During the first
fourteen weeks of the coronavirus pandemic alone, Trump made six-hundred and fifty-four
false or misleading claims.4 With his failures now measured in lives lost to the virus (some a
direct consequence of his own misguided claims regarding the efficacy of
hydroxychloroquine as a cure), public confidence in the national leadership has plummeted.5
On key issues of economy, health care, racial inequality and the coronavirus response, voters
now overwhelmingly favor Democratic nominee Joe Biden.6
As Trump’s legacy continues to spoil, his Republican predecessor is enjoying a
presidential rehabilitation. After exiting the White House as the most unpopular president in
the nation’s history, George W. Bush now holds a sixty-one percent favourability rating:
among democrats, that number has improved from just eleven percent to fifty-four percent. 7
Trump’s failure to rise to the coronavirus challenge has resulted in Bush’s unlikely reemergence as a voice of hope and exemplar of leadership. On May 2, 2020, the Bush
Presidential Library released a video showing frontline workers battling the virus, images
from 9/11, and a message from Bush calling for national unity:
Let us remember we have faced times of testing before, following 9/11 I saw a
great nation rise as one to honor the brave, to grieve with the grieving, and to
embrace unavoidable new duties… Let us remember that empathy and simple
kindness are essential, powerful tools of national recovery... In the final analysis,
we are not partisan combatants, we are human beings, equally vulnerable and
equally wonderful in the sight of God.8
Daniel Dale and Tara Subramaniam, “Fact Check: Breaking down Trump’s 654 false claims over 14
weeks during the coronavirus pandemic.” CNN, May 29, 2020.
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/29/politics/fact-check-trump-coronavirus-pandemic-dishonesty/index.html
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wiS1J1hjQK4.
4

89

To some, the video served as a reminder of Trump’s own incompetence as a leader.
“Whereas previous presidents, including Bush, sought to heal divisions in the country
following crises,” Chandelis Duster argued for CNN, “Trump has… frequently cast the
nation’s recovery from the pandemic in the context of his re-election.”9 Forgiven, or
seemingly forgotten, is Bush’s own legacy as a post-truth president: the lies told with
impunity; the loss of moral standing; the degradation of respect for human rights. While Bush
calls for humanity in the present, it is important to remember that his own administration
failed to treat “enemy combatants” as human beings with legal protections under the Geneva
Conventions. Indeed, as America recovered from the terrorist attacks, war was not an
unavoidable duty, but a deliberate and calculated attack fuelled by grudges, unreliable
intelligence, fearmongering and lies.
One president’s failures should not erase another’s. Indeed, Bush paved the way for
the current state of American politics: the choices made by his administration after 9/11
foreshadowed the dishonesty plaguing political discourse today. To rewrite that legacy
through the lens of nostalgia fails to hold the national leadership accountable for their errors,
if only in the history books. As the nation enters a new period in its history, fighting an
enemy impervious to guns and missiles, the presidency of Bush should serve as a warning
that false or misleading claims have dire consequences. Now is not the time to forget that
legacy but to learn from it, if only in the hope that we can hold our leaders to a higher
standard than has been set in the past.

Chandelis Duster, “Trump attacks Bush after 43rd president offers message of unity.” CNN, May 4, 2020.
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